

## Poker with a Three Card Deck<sup>1</sup>

We start with a three card deck containing one Ace, one King and one Queen. Alice and Bob are each dealt one card at random. There is a pot of \$  $P$  (and we assume  $P \geq 0$ ).

Alice may either check or bet \$1. If Alice bets, Bob may either call or fold. If Alice checks Bob either checks or bets. If Bob bets, Alice either checks or folds.

We begin with some basic observations.

- **If Alice has a King she should check:** If Alice has a King, Bob has either an Ace or a Queen. If he has an Ace he will call and win. If he has a Queen he will fold. In either case Alice gains nothing by betting.

- **If Alice checks and Bob has a King, he should check** As above, Alice either has an Ace or Queen and if Bob bets Alice will do the right thing and Bob gains nothing.

- **If Alice checks and Bob bets, Alice should fold with a Queen and call with an Ace.**

- **If Alice bets, Bob should call with an Ace and fold with a Queen**

This still leaves several options for Alice and Bob.

- If Alice has an Ace, she has the choice of betting (hoping Bob will call with a King) or checking (hoping Bob will bluff with a Queen).
- If Alice has a King she will check, but she may either call or fold when Bob bets.
- If Alice has a Queen she has a choice to check or bluff.
- If Bob has a King and Alice bets he has a choice of checking or folding.
- If Bob has a Queen and Alice checks, Bob has a choice of checking or bluffing.

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<sup>1</sup>This example is from Bill Chen and Jerrod Ankenman's *The Mathematics of Poker*

There are five interesting probabilities.

$x$  = probability Alice checks with and Ace;

$y$  = probability Alice calls with a King if Bob bets;

$z$  = probability Alice bluffs with a Queen;

$s$  = probability Bob will call with a King when Alice bets;

$t$  = probability that Bob will bluff with a Queen.

We attempt to find what these probabilities are in an optimal strategy.

**1)  $x$  and  $z$  should be chosen so that Bob is indifferent between calling and folding when he holds a King and Alice bets.**

Suppose Alice bets and Bob holds a King. His expectation if he folds is 0. His expectation if he calls is

$$\frac{x}{2}(-1) + \frac{z}{2}(P + 1).$$

Setting this equal to 0, we see that

$$\frac{x}{z} = \frac{1}{P + 1} \tag{1}$$

We will try to solve for the other probabilities in terms of  $x$ .

**2) If Alice checks and Bob holds a Queen, he should bluff so that Alice is indifferent between calling and fold with a King.**

Suppose Alice checks a King and Bob bets. Alice's expectation if she folds is 0. Her expectation if she calls is

$$\frac{1}{2}(-1) + \frac{t}{2}(P + 1).$$

Thus Alice is indifferent between folding and calling when

$$t = \frac{1}{P + 1} \tag{2}.$$

**3) If Alice checks a King and Alice should call with a frequency that makes Bob indifferent between checking and bluffing with a Queen.**

Suppose Alice checks a King and Bob holds a Queen. Bob's expected value of folding is 0.

If Alice checks, what is the probability she holds an ace?

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Prob}(\text{Alice has an Ace given that she checks}) &= \frac{\text{Prob}(\text{Alice has Ace and checks})}{\text{Prob}(\text{Alice checks})} \\
 &= \frac{\frac{1-x}{2}}{\frac{1-x}{2} + \frac{1}{2}} \\
 &= \frac{1-x}{2-x}
 \end{aligned}$$

and The probability Alice has a King given that she checks is  $\frac{1}{2-x}$ .  
 Thus the expected value for Bob for bluffing with a Queen is

$$\frac{1-x}{2-x}(-1) + \frac{y}{2-x}(-1) + \frac{1-y}{2-x}(P)$$

Setting this equal to 0 we see that

$$y = 1 + \frac{x-2}{P+1} \quad (3)$$

**4) If Alice bets and Bob has a King, he should call to make Alice indifferent between checking a Queen and Bluffing.**

If Alice has a Q, the expectation of folding is 0. The expectation of bluffing is

$$\frac{1}{2}(-1) + \frac{s}{2}(-1) + \frac{1-s}{2}P$$

Setting this equal to 0 we see that

$$s = \frac{P-1}{P+1} \quad (4)$$

Summarizing we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{x}{z} &= \frac{1}{P+1} \\
 y &= 1 + \frac{x-2}{P+1} \\
 s &= \frac{P-1}{P+1}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$t = \frac{1}{P+1}$$

We still need to determine  $x$ . Alice should choose  $x$  to maximize expectation. There are six equally likely possibilities.

**case 1** Alice has the Ace, Bob has the King

Alice will bet with probability  $x$ . If she bets, Bob will call with probability  $s$ . If she checks, Bob will check. Alice's expectation is:

$$x(y(P+1) + (1-y)P) + (1-x)P.$$

**case 2** Alice has the Ace, Bob has the Queen

Alice will bet with probability  $x$ . If she bets, Bob will fold. If she checks, Bob will bluff with probability  $t$ , in which case Alice will call. Alice's expectation is:

$$xP + (1-x)(t(P+1) + (1-t)P).$$

**case 3** Alice has the King, Bob has the Ace

Alice will check. Bob will bet. Alice will call with probability  $y$ . If she calls, she will lose. Alice's expectation is  $-y$ .

**case 4** Alice has the King, Bob has the Queen

Alice will check. Bob will bluff with probability  $t$ . If he bets, Alice will call with probability  $y$ . Alice's expectation is:

$$ty(P+1) + (1-t)P.$$

**case 5** Alice has the Queen, Bob has the Ace

Alice will bluff with probability  $z$ . If she bluffs, Bob will call. If Alice checks, Bob bets and Alice folds. Alice's expectation is  $-z$ .

**case 6** Alice has the Queen, Bob has the King

Alice will bluff with probability  $z$ . If she bluffs, Bob will call with probability  $s$ . If she checks, Bob will call. Alice's expectation is

$$z(-y + (1-y)P).$$

Each of these cases is equally likely with probability  $1/6$ . Since  $y, z, s, t$  are all determined by  $x$ . We can find the expectation as a function of  $x$ .

With a lot of algebra, we see that

$$E(x) = \left( \left( 1 - \frac{3}{P+1} \right) x + \frac{3P^2 + 2P + 1}{P+1} \right).$$

As  $0 \leq x \leq 1$  and  $E(x)$  is linear in  $x$ , there are three possibilities:

If  $0 \leq P < 2$ , then  $E(x)$  is maximized when  $x = 0$ .

If  $P = 2$ , then  $E(x)$  is independent of  $x$ .

If  $P > 2$ , then  $E(x)$  is maximized when  $x = 1$ .

Thus if  $P < 2$ , Alice's can play  $x = 0$  and have expectation

$$\frac{3P^2 + 2P + 1}{P + 1} > \frac{P}{2}$$

, while if  $P > 2$  Alice should use  $x = 1$  and have expectation

$$\frac{3P^2 + 3P - 1}{P + 1} < \frac{P}{2}.$$

Thus if  $P \leq 2$  Alice has an advantage, while if  $P > 2$ , Bob has an advantage.