STAT/ECON 474 Game Theory
Final Exam Study Guide

- The final exam is Wed May 8 10:30-12:30.

- The exam will be cumulative cover Chapters 1–11, 13 and 16 plus stable matching. There will likely be questions on material that has not yet been covered on exams: stable matching, repeated games, evolutionarily stable solutions. Other questions are likely to be drawn from the main topics of the course: IDSDS, mixed strategy Nash equilibria, Cournot and Stackleberg equilibria, extensive games, Bayesian games and signaling games

- I have posted some suggested practice problems from Chapter 16. These will not be collected or graded, but I will post solutions on Blackboard.

- There is a reading guide on the webpage explaining which material your are responsible for in each chapter.

  http://www.math.uic.edu/~marker/stat473-F19/reading.html

- There is a week-by-week syllabus on the webpage:

  http://www.math.uic.edu/~marker/stat473-F19/wtw.html

- The web page has some notes on IDSDS, Cournot equilibria, a simple poker model, auctions and stable matching and a link to a discussion of the Folk Theorem for repeated games.

- One of the best ways to study is to do the *Check Your Understanding* problems in the text.

- You will have two hours for the exam, but it will only be slightly longer than the midterms.

- The exam problems will be similar to the problem sets and practice problems, but there will probably be several short answer questions like the ones on midterms.

- You should be able to define basic concepts, like dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibria, Bayes-Nash equilibria and perfect Bayesian equilibria, stable matchings, grim trigger strategies...

- I will have the following office hours during week 15 and final's week.

    - Monday April 29, 12:30-2:30
    - Wednesday May 1, 9:00-10:30
    - Friday May 3, 12:30-2:30
    - Monday May 6, 12:30-3:30
    - Tuesday May 7 9:00-11:00, 12:30-3:00