Newer and Recently Included Material

  1. December 2000. Petitions asking why Senator Mitch McConnell is blocking aid to Yugoslavia (see here).
  2. July 6, 1999. What you can do to push for the investigation of war crimes. (This section still under construction, most links work, but a few do not.)
  3. June 25, 1999. A brief note on the $5 million bounty which the U.S. has placed on the capture of President Milosevic.
  4. June 24, 1999. President Clinton responds to one of my letters.
  5. June 22, 1999: Three issues to consider after the bombing on 1) death totals, 2) precisely what "demilitarizing the KLA" means and 3) questions about war crimes investigations.
  6. June 7, 1999: Material on promises of humanitarian aid made by the international community and what has been actually done. Also suggestions on what could be done. This included a section on removing depleted uranium.
  7. June 1, 1999: Further material on the daytime bombing of a bridge in Varvarin can be found in the section on collateral damage.
  8. May 26, 1999: Material on depleted uranium can be found in Section Seven.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I have constructed the table of contents as a set of questions. This is in part because each section of this webpage is meant to answer a certain question or a highlight an issue regarding the War in Kosovo.
 
 
  1. Q: Where can I find sources on the current conflict in the Balkans? A: Sources of information.
  2. Q: How can I use these sources? A: An example which answers the question, "How much is this conflict costing and who is going to pay for this?" and which shows how I answered it.
  3. Q: What are some important questions to ask and what are the answers? A: This section of facts and figures is like a "Harper's Index" of basic questions which have precise, numerical answers.
  4. Q: How much is being spent on military actions in the Balkans and how much is being spent on humanitarian aid?A: One of the most crucial questions. The answer is given in terms of a visual diagram.
  5. Q: What are some other important questions to ask about this conflict? A: A set of open questions which should be asked but for which I do not have answers yet. Your help and assistance would be appreciated.
  6. Q: What is collateral damage? A: Collateral damage is a term which NATO has used often to describe civilian injury and death caused by its air strikes.
  7. Q: What is depleted uranium? A: Depleted uranium is the radioactive waste (U-238) of nuclear power plants. It is used in NATO munitions and is being fired in Yugoslavia. This section details how is it being used, why is it being used, what are the consequences of using it, and how is the press covering its usage.
  8. Q: What promises have been made by the international community for humanitarian aid and what has actually been delivered? A: Included are three examples and a suggestion of what could be done.
  1. INTRO
  2. SOURCES
    1. The Federation of American Scientists (an organization which grew out of the Manhattan Project) maintains its website at www.fas.org. One of its sections provided detailed descriptions of the U.S. arsenal, including the Tomahawk cruise missile. Another of its sections, titled Target Kosovo, maintains news links to at least forty different sources, including a) the standard TV media, b) various American newspapers such as the Washington Post, NY Times, etc. c) alternative periodicals such as Z Magazine, d) foreign publications such as webpages maintained by the BBC, e) the Guardian (see below for more details), f) Tanjug (the official Yugoslav media), g) Kosovar Albanian newspapers. Of special note are the publications listed below in greater detail.

      2.  

       

    2. The LA Times is of particular interest because one of its journalists, Paul Watson , is the only non-Serbian journalist in Kosovo. As a result, his reports from Kosovo's capital, Pristina, are especially important.
    3. The Christian Science Monitor is notable for its coverage particularly of depleted uranium. Much of the information presented here comes from Scott Peterson's cover articles on April 29 and 30th of 1999.
    4. The Economist (periodical) provides economic data succinctly. As the second section of this document will show, I have quoted the Economist frequently.

      5.  

       

    5. The Guardian (English newspaper) is particularly valuable for its assessment of war damage.
    6. The Center for Stategic and International Studies contains a number of very extensive articles written by Andrew Cordesman on the capabilities of Serbian military.

      7.  

       

    7. The periodical room at the UIC library subscribes to at least 20 different newspapers. In addition, there is a government documents section on the third floor.
    8. Official links are at www.house.gov, www.senate.gov, www.whitehouse.gov, www.state.gov, www.nato.int.

      9.  

       

    9. Last but by no means least one should not forget foreign nationals within the Math Department and the information that they may have because they follow the news of their own countries. (e.g. In the last 50 days, I have conferred with Bulgarian, Chinese, French, Hungarian, Portuguese, Serbian, and Spanish nationals. Some facts such as the statistic that 80% of Bulgarian citizens oppose the Bulgarian government's decision to grant NATO its airspace would have been virtually impossible to find without Bulgarian nationals.)

      10.  

       

    Back to top.
  3. AN EXAMPLE OF USING THESE SOURCES
    4. Back to top.
  4. FACTS AND FIGURES
    1. Cost of military operations in Balkans from 3-24 to 4-30: 3.5 billion English pounds or $5.6 billion (The Guardian, May 9, 1999).
    2. Portion to be paid by U.S.: 25%; to be paid by rest of NATO: 75% (Burdensharing Amendment to Defense Authorization Act for FY1998).
    3. Economic damage caused by air strikes from 3-24 to mid April: $24 billion (Marketplace, the Economist), 3-24 to current by extrapolation: ~$40 billion.
    4. Amount pledged by NATO to humanitarian relief: $37 million. (The Economist, May 8, 1999, page 50)
    5. Total number of refugees accepted by U.S.: 460; by NATO: 26,000, by Albania: ~370,000. (The Economist, May 8, 1999, page 50)
    6. Total number of refugees accepted by U.S. not confined to military bases such as Fort Dix: 102 (Nightline, May 12, 1999)
    7. GNP of U.S.: ~$7,100 billion (1995) ; of Albania: $2.3 billion. (World Bank)
    8. Percentage of Serbian tanks destroyed by air strikes (3-24 to 4-30): ~15% (French armed forces chief Jean-Pierre Kelche, The Guardian, http://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/The_Paper/Daily/0,2846,46440,00.html)
    9. Total number of tanks in Serbia prior to conflict: ~1000 (Andrew Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies, www.csis.org); remaining tanks: 850.
    10. Estimated number of civilians killed by NATO airstrikes (3-24 to late April): 500 (Tanjug), 100 (NATO), 300 (The Guardian).
    11. Estimated number of civilians killed by Serbian military: 3,000 3-24 to late April, Chicago Tribune, 4-24, 1999) 4,600 (3-24 to present, The Guardian).
    12. Estimated number of civilians killed by KLA: unknown.
    13. Incidents of violence (sometimes involving death) directed by KLA against Serbian government 1997 to 3-24: 179.
    14. Number of Kosovar Albanians: 1.8 million.
    15. Number of Kosovar Albanian refugees outside Serbia prior to 3-24: 100,000; currently: 900,000.
    16. Number of Kosovar Albanians currently displaced from their homes in total and by percent: 1.6 million, 90%. (The Economist, May 8, 1999, page 50)
    Back to top.
  5. EXAMINING THE DATA
    6.  
  Total economic damage caused by NATO
  
  
  damage:   $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
            $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
  
  
  aid:      $
  (humani-
  tarian)
  

     
  U.S.      P
  
  Albania   PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
            PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
            PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
            PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
            PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
            PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
            PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
            PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
            PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
            PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
            PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
            PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
            PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
            PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
            PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
  6. OPEN QUESTIONS
    1. How much money is the KLA receiving and from whom?
    2. How many civilians has the KLA killed in the last fifty days?
    3. What are NATO's total losses in military hardware and personnel? This question is particularly subject to wild variations. NATO officially says this is F-117, F-16, two Apache helicopters, a number of unmanned aircraft and two pilots killed. Other sources claim that more than 40 NATO aircraft have been destroyed. (http://members.xoom.com/ggromozeka/aviation/ is extensively documented yet leaves many questions unanswered.)
    4. What is the estimated number of civilians likely to die in Kosovo in the next two weeks from a) malnutrition, b) dehydration, c) exposure, d) disease?
    5. Specific questions for each air strike:
      1. What has been hit,
      2. How many were killed,
      3. What is the economic damage,
      4. What is the military damage,
      5. Why was it bombed and what is the justification,
      6. Who made the decision,
      7. What missile or hardware was used,
      8. Who is reporting this?
    6. What are NATO's military goals? the Serbian army's? the KLA's?
    7. How successful has each side been?
    8. How much civilian death and injury is each side willing to risk in order to achieve its goals?
    9. How much military damage and casualties is each side willing to risk to achieve its goals?
    Back to top.
  7. COLLATERAL DAMAGE
    1. The ratio of military injury to civilian injury "Pristina's hospital alone has treated between 300 and 400 people wounded by cluster bombs since NATO's air war began March 24, Grbic said. Roughly half of those victims were civilians, he said." (http://www.latimes.com/HOME/NEWS/REPORTS/YUGO/DISPATCH/t000038109.html)
    2. The use of depleted uranium in NATO weapons The US Defense Department says its aircraft are firing depleted uranium (DU) munitions in the conflict with Serbia. The Military Toxics Project and Dr Hari Sharma, of the University of Waterloo, Ontario, have published the results of a study into the use of DU munitions in the Gulf. They say the result is likely to be an increase of between 20,000 and 100,000 fatal cancers in veterans and Iraqi citizens. (BBC, Friday, May 7, 1999, "Pentagon confirms depleted uranium use")


      3. In 1996, the UN declared missiles made of depleted uranium to be weapons of mass destruction and called on them to be banned.

      (For more on depleted uranium, go to depleted uranium.)

    3. The use and nature of cluster bombs Cluster bombs, presumably from NATO, struck a hospital complex and a market, where dismembered bodies were strewn among carrots and other vegetables in pools of blood. At least 15 people died and 60 others were wounded. (Bombs Hit Yugoslav Hospital Complex, AP, Friday, May 7, 1999)


      4.  Sky reporter Geoff Meade in Nis said: "I can find no evidence at all that this could be a military target." He confirmed having seen a number of civilian casualties, including an elderly couple, and said the walls of the city centre were "pock-marked" with shrapnel, consistent with the effects of clusterbombs.

      Nato military spokesman General Walter Jertz insisted: "we do not target any civilian targets whatsoever." (May 7, 1999, The Guardian)

       Cluster bombs
       
       

    4. Other instances of NATO collateral damage which include NATO air strikes on 1) a Kosovar Albanian convoy in early April (~70 dead), 2) a Serbian train (10 dead), 3) buses of civilians (39 dead, 20 dead in separate incidents).
    5. Environmental damage and carcinogens released as a result of NATO bombing (i.e. the destruction of a chemical factory in Pancevo, 10 miles from Belgrade in early April. A large cloud of Vinyl monomer chloride was released into the atmosphere. VCM is so carcinogenic that it is prohibited in the U.S. and the European Union.)


      6. NATO's sustained destruction of Serbian oil dumps and chemical depots has fuelled fears of an environmental disaster across the Balkans. In northern Greece, people are stockpiling bottled water and canned food after warnings that the bombardment had released poisonous dioxins into the atmosphere. Fears that the poison had been blown to Greece were given unexpected credence by France last week, which warned shoppers to avoid asparagus--one of Greece's biggest agricultural exports. ("Poison cloud fears go as Allies target Serb chemicals," May 9, 1999, The Guardian)

       Back to top.

    6. Daytime bombing


      7. Every time NATO launches air strikes, there are two obvious tactical questions that have to be answered.

      The second question brings up the issue of daytime bombing versus nightime bombing. This was also brought up recently (5-30-1999) when NATO air strikes hit a bridge in Varvarin a little after 1 p.m. on a religious holiday. Here is an excerpt from an article in the Washington Post:

      BELGRADE, "May 30, missiles hit a bridge in central Serbia crowded with traffic and pedestrians this afternoon, killing nine people and injuring at least 17, the official Yugoslav news agency Tanjug said...Tanjug said NATO planes fired four missiles at the Velika Morava River bridge in Varvarin, about 100 miles south of Belgrade, shortly after 1 p.m. when many people and vehicles were crossing it...Cars reportedly plunged into the river and 15 boats brought rescue teams to search for victims...NATO insists that all such casualties are unintentional...The raids reflected increasing daylight strikes by NATO." (Washington Post, May 31, 1999, page A19, NATO Day Raids Said To Kill Some Civilians Bridge, Reporters' Convoy Allegedly Hit) http://search.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/1999-05/31/116l-053199-idx.html

      The first question that should be asked is whether NATO, in fact, meant to strike this target or whether they are claiming that it was a mistake. An article in Reuters answers this issue.

      "Shea acknowledged attacks in both locations but was unable to confirm the reports of civilian casualties. `It's clear that NATO aircraft did attack that bridge (in Varvarin) yesterday...That bridge is, was, a legitimate, designated military target...This bridge was hit accurately. We're not talking about a missile that went astray,' Shea said." (BRUSSELS, May 31, 1999 (Reuters))

      This is corroborated by an article from the BBC:

      "Nato has acknowledged that at least four of its aircraft targetted the bridge, which was croweded with market day traffic and pedestrians." (BBC, 6-1-1999, "NATO bombs kill 17 in sanatorium")

      In an NPR report, Colonel Konrad Freitag also reiterated Mr. Shea's claim by saying, "this [the bridge] was a legitimate military target because it belonged to the major lines of communication." Although this tells why NATO targetted this particular bridge, it doesn't explain why NATO choose to destroy it at 1 p.m. when civilian traffic was particularly heavy. In the Reuters article, it goes on to quote Slavoljub Blagojevic, manager of a nearby sports centre, who remarked that " 'today is a religious holiday and market day. Thousands of people were on and around the bridge.' Eight bodies, including that of a priest with his head blasted away, were lying in a local morgue attached to a nearby Orthodox church. The ninth victim, a girl, died on the way to hospital in the nearby town of Krusevac." Regarding Mr. Blagojevic's claim that many people were out because it was a religious holiday, I was able to verify with no difficulty that Sunday, May 30 was the holiday, Descent of the Holy Spirit, for the Eastern Orthodox Church.

      This, of course, raises the obvious question, "Why did NATO decide to bomb this bridge during the daytime and during a religious holiday when the maximum number of civilians were likely to be near or on the bridge?" This very question was, in fact, addressed to NATO but as Julie McCarthy of NPR reported:

      "There was a discernable hardening in NATO's tone as it addressed questions of civilian casualties. NATO no longer apologizes or says that it regrets the error. When asked how NATO reconciles its policy of intensified daytime bombing with its stated aim to minimize civilian casualties, spokeman Jamie Shea sidestepped the quesiton, providing a litany of Belgrade's sins instead." NPR, 5-31-1999

      NPR's report was corroborated by a May 31 article from Reuters:

      "Asked about reported civilian casualties from NATO attacks on a bridge and a sanatorium in Serbia, Shea instead responded with a catalogue of the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians victimized by Belgrade's forces operating in Kosovo."

      The issue of daytime bombing during a religious holiday is brought up again but not answered by an article in Reuters which noted:

      "Mr. Shea said: 'NATO does not attack civilian targets, we attack exclusively military targets and take every precaution to avoid inflicting harm on civilians.' " (Reuters, 5-30-1999, "Nine killed in NATO bridge bombing")

      It's at this point that I run out of articles and information. As the incident stands, there appears to be a contradiction between NATO's policies as articulated by Mr. Shea to "take every precaution to avoid inflicting harm on civilians" and this daytime bombing during a religious holiday. Therefore, if anyone has an article in which NATO addresses and answers this issue, I would be very interested in reading this. (Appropriate documentation would be greatly appreciated.)

      There is another approach as well which may prove helpful in generating an answer to this issue. Media such as NPR and Reuters have been posing the question of daytime bombing, but NATO has not been answering it. Below is a story suggestion which one may send to various media to express an interest in this type of story, the point being that if enough people indicate interest, more reporters may ask questions. In addition, one may note that the story suggestion inquires whether NATO is taking any precautions on religious holidays which fall on June 3, June 28, July 7 and July 12. 

      RE: STORY SUGGESTION on NATO's daytime bombing

Recently (May 30, 1999), NATO bombed a bridge in central Serbia (Varvarin) in which an
estimated 9 civilians were killed.  The bombing occurred in the daytime (a little after 1 p.m.)
and on the Orthodox holiday, the Descent of the Holy Spirit when civilian traffic on the
bridge was particularly heavy.  On this subject, Reuters has quoted NATO spokesman Jamie
Shea as saying, "NATO does not attack civilian targets, we attack exclusively military targets
and take every precaution to avoid inflicting harm on civilians."  

I would be very interested in reading an article which addressed the sort of precautions
NATO was considering taking on these four  religious holidays when civilian traffic on
bridges is likely to be much greater:

1) June 3--St. Constantine and Helen,
2) June 28--St. Lazarus Day,
3) July 7--Birth of St. John,
4) July 12--St. Peter and Paul.

In addition, it would be very interesting to know what sort of precautions NATO took in its
bombing on May 30th.  In specific, is there any military reason why the bridge in Varvarin
could not have been hit during the early morning hours in order to minimize civilian
casualties?

Regards,
      A comprehensive article which lists instances of collateral damage and then provides brief descriptions of each can be found at BBC article (6-1-99).
    7. Use of human shields Back to top.
  8. DEPLETED URANIUMDepleted uranium is currently used in weapons because its high density (1.7 times as dense as lead) gives it armor piercing capabilities. There are other metals such as tungsten (the filament in incandescent bulbs) which also have this property. (Tungsten is used in weapons which the U.S. Navy has.) However, depleted uranium (U-238) has the economic advantage that it is cheap and plentiful since it is a waste product of nuclear reactors. It has the disadvantage in that the substance is highly radioactive and has an extremely long half-life of 4.5 billion years. For these reasons, the United Nations in 1996 declared that missiles made of it were weapons of mass destruction and called for them to be banned.


    9. I consider the following to be crucial questions on this issue (Some have answers; unfortunately, most do not. Again if anyone has answers with documentation to these, I would be very interested in hearing about this.):

    1. Precisely which munitions are made of depleted uranium? "A-10 tankbusters are using DU weapons." (BBC, May 7, 1999, "Pentagon confirms use of DU")
    2. What is the difference in cost between producing a cruise missile made of depleted uranium and producing a comparable one made of tungsten? (Depleted uranium as a waste product from nuclear reactors may in fact have a negative cost, that is, one might be paid to dispose of it.) What is this difference in cost as a percentage of the total cost of a cruise missile (~$1 million)?

      3.  

       

    3. How radioactive are anti-tank bullets made from depleted uranium? They emit 260 to 270 millirems/hour. (Christian Science Monitor, April 28, 1999)

      4.  

       

    4. What is the maximum recommended exposure to radiation? 100 millirems/year (Christian Science Monitor, April 28, 1999) This is corroborated by"The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's maximum limit...is 100 millirems per year." (BBC, May 11, 1999, "Pentagon's man in uranium warning,")

      5.  

       

    5. At what risk are U.S. military personnel (such as aircraft pilots) from exposure to depleted uranium during flights?

      6.  

       

    6. At what risk are other military personnel (such as ground troops)? Armaments made of depleted uranium partially evaporate on impact. The resulting vapor can be inhaled and cause radiation sickness and cancer.

      7.  

       

    7. What companies are manufacturing weapons made of DU? If UN and other peacekeeping personnel or civilians become ill from exposure to DU, what is the liability of these companies? What level of radiation would there need to be to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the presence of DU presented a significant contribution to ill health?

      8.  

       

    8. What risks do weapons of depleted uranium pose to civilians?

      9.  

       

    9. Where has depleted uranium weapons been used and how much as been used? Iraq during the Gulf War was hit by weapons containing 315 tons of depleted uranium.

      10.  

       

    10. Is the medical condition suffered by U.S. veterans, Gulf War Syndrome, caused by exposure to depleted uranium?

      11.  

       

    11. How much has been used in Yugoslavia? And where has it been used? Primarily in Belgrade? in Kosovo?

      12.  

       

    12. If 100 pounds of depleted uranium is dropped in Yugoslavia in 1999, how much will remain in ten years? 99.99999984957 pounds. DU has a half- life of 4.5 billion years. (Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, see under "uranium")

      13.  

       

    13. How is depleted uranium safely cleaned up and neutralized? How much does it cost to remove 1 ton of depleted uranium? How much will it cost to remove all the depleted uranium dropped on Yugoslavia, and who will pay the cost?

      14.  

       

    14. How has the issue been covered in the press and by NATO and the US? The following is a brief selection of quotes.

      15.  

       

      1. "...there is the persistent concern over depleted uranium (DU) munitions. DU is a very dense metal, which helps it to penetrate armour effectively. It is also toxic, carcinogenic, and radioactive...(BBC, April 19, 1999, "Bombing threatens Serbs' environment, http://news2.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid%5F323000/32311 3.stm)

        2.  

         

      2. (from the same article)
          3. BBC News Online: Is NATO using DU?
          NATO spokesman: NATO is not using nuclear weapons.
          BBC News Online: Thank you. But that is not what I asked.
          NATO spokesman: (laughs)
           
           
      3. (again from the same article) "The U.S. Army has no DU munitions in theatre and no plans to send them, says Lt. Col. Bill Wheelehan, an Army weapons spokesman at the Pentagon. But the U.S. Air Force does have DU capability in the conflict."

        4.  

         

      4. "In Brussels, a NATO spokesperson told another Mainichi reporter that NATO used depleted uranium bullets during air raids on Yugoslavia. This is the first time that the use of depleted uranium bullets has officially been confirmed since the 1991 Gulf War." (Mainichi Daily News, 4-21-1999, "NATO accused of using uranium bullets")

        5.  

         

      5. "The [U.S.] Air Force says that it has the capability to use DU, but that it hasn't thus far." (Christian Science Monitor, 4-29-1999, www.csmonitor.com/durable/1999/04/29/fpl1s2-csm.shtml)

        6.  

         

      6. Also from the same article, "....A Subcommission of the UN Human Rights Commission resolved in 1996 that DU was a weapon of mass destruction that should be banned...A Monitor reporter [Scott Peterson] who travelled throughout the region [Iraq] watched a radioactive detector carried over parts of those battlefields register about 35 times normal background radiation."
      7. Veiko Markovic (BBC audience member): Is NATO using depleted uranium ammunition in Yugoslavia?

        8. Jamie Shea (NATO spokesman): I am not going to comment on the type of ammunition that NATO uses because that is an operational question.(BBC, Talking Point ONAIR debate, 4-29-1999)
         
         
      8. "...NATO says DU is no more dangerous than any other heavy metal. Its spokesman, Major Dan Baggio, says a DU round contained about as much uranium as would go into a 'glow-in-the-dark type of watch." (BBC, May 11, 1999, "Pentagon's man in uranium warning," http://news2.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid%5F340000/34094 4.stm) However, the same article later on mentions, " Dr Rokke told BBC News Online it had been mislead by Major Baggio." One might compare Baggio's claim with Scott Peterson's article in the Christian Science Monitor (April 28, 1999) in which a round of depleted uranium is measured to emit 275 millirems of radiation per hour with 300 millirems/year cited as an upper limit of exposure for one person, or compare this with another quote from the same BBC article which says, "A senior official of the U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency ...said there was 'a possible exposure rate of 200 millirems per hour on contact.' The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's maximum limit...is 100 millirems per year."
      9. Responding to a question from Labour MP Tom Dalyell, who raised concerns over the long-term health risks for civilians from depleted uranium shells, Mr Cook assured the House that no such shells were being used by the RAF. (BBC, May 18, 1999,"UK forensic teams for Kosovo")http://news2.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk%5Fpolitics/newsid%5 F347000/347065.stm

    Some Final Comments about Depleted Uranium

    Depleted uranium is one of the most compelling subjects of this war for a number of reasons:
    1. The first and foremost is that the side effects of depleted uranium munitions will be felt for the foreseeable future. Given the extraodinarily long half-life of the substance, depleted uranium will not be decaying into a more harmless state anytime soon. In 1000 years, 99.99998% of the DU that NATO drops in the Balkans will still be there emitting radioactivity unless some human effort is made to remove it.

      2.  

       

    2. The second is that because of its long lasting radioactivity and toxicity, the UN has declared it to be a weapon of mass destruction, which is the same category that is reserved for chemical and biological weaponry. The fact that the U.S. and NATO are actively using this sort of munition sets a certain precedent for using a weapon of mass destruction. This raises the question in the future of whether it would be acceptable for other nations such as Russia,China or Iraq to use weapons made of DU, and if not, what would be the appropriate response. (Since DU is a byproduct of nuclear power plants, any country which has nuclear plants will have a supply of material. Also, given that First World countries which have nuclear power will pay to get rid of the waste products of nuclear power, this raises the obvious question of how difficult it would be from some non-nuclear country such as Iraq to obtain DU and make weapons from it.)

      3.  

       

    3. Given DU's danger and toxicity, there are one of two mutually exclusive possibilities concerning its future use by any nation.
    4. Now given reasons 1, 2, and 3 which argue against making weapons of DU, the obvious question is why DU was used. The simplest and most compelling reason is one of cost-cutting--DU is cheap; tungsten is expensive. Therefore, from the standpoint of the manufacturer (Q: who manufactures A- 10 tankbusters?), there is a simple profit motive. Within the military industry and within the U.S. government, there was a calculation made that the benefit in savings and the increase in profits outweighed 1) setting a precedent for using radioactive weapons and 2) civilian injury as well as injury to friendly forces as well from exposure to DU. Trying to retrace and determine that calculation and others is the basic goal of all these open questions. In this conflict, there are objectives that each side is trying to achieve; there is a certain amount of death and injury that each side is willing to inflict; and there is a certain cost that each is willing to bear. The first question before all others is how much a side is willing to risk in cost and injury to achieve its goals. DU is perhaps the most transparent example of this in the entire conflict.

      5.  

       

    5. The next reason is that the official response on DU and its use has been shifting for the last thirty days (late April to late May). Certain statements avoid the issue such as Jamie Shea's response above. Others may be technically true, but are misleading (cf. Wheelehan's claim that the Army has no DU munitions. This, of course, says nothing about the Air Force. Also note Robin Cook's claim that the RAF uses no DU. While this might be true, it says nothing about whether NATO uses DU and what Britain's position is on that.)

      6.  

       

    6. The last issue is concerns the coverage of DU in the US press. With the exception of Scott Peterson's articles in the Christian Science Monitor, the US press seems to have been fairly silent on this issue. As such, this raises the general issue of how the conflict is covered by various media and whether it is being covered well, but that is the topic of another section.

      7.  

       

    Back to top.
  9. WHAT HAS BEEN PROMISED FOR KOSOVO AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE


    10. Now that a peace agreement may end the war in the Balkans, there is the obvious next question: what is to be done (and how should international community respond to this humanitarian crisis). Five weeks ago, the European Union addressed this very issue as the Wall Street Journal reported ("NATO broadens its air war in Yugoslavia," 4- 28-99).

    "With no sign that the air campaign will end soon, it is difficult to predict the post war financial needs of the Balkan region. But in meetings in Washington this week, the EU's commissioner for economic and monetary affairs, Yves-Thibault de Silguy has been tossing around an estimate of $30 billion to rebuild destroyed infrastructure, aid hundreds of thousands of refugees and make up for the lost trade in the region...The EU has pledged or is in the process of committing $1.2 billion in assistance, and Mr. de Silguy wants a quick commitment from rich countries to put the World Bank, IMF and the European Commission in charge of the aid effort."

    However, as NPR and the BBC have reported since President Milosevic and the Yugoslav Parliament accepted the terms of the peace agreement, "at the end of the European Union summit, Germany, Britain, and France made it clear that Serbia [including Kosovo*] will get no international aid as long as he [Milosevic] remains in power." (BBC, "Milosevic in NATO's sights," 6-4-99)

    *Since the peace agreement does not call for an independent state of Kosovo, the Republic of Serbia necessarily includes Kosovo as well.

    Although it is possible to understand the rationale behind this (can't reward the indicted war criminal), it is also possible to see how the EU is simply trying to get out of the promises that it made earlier. As such, there are two issues that should be discussed.

    1. Although President Milosevic may "remain...in power," that power does not extend to Kosovo where foreign armed troops will be the law rather President Milosevic. Therefore, why shouldn't at least this region qualify for international aid?
    2. What track record does the EU and the international community have for keeping its promises to provide assistance?
      1. MONEY FOR HUMANITARIAN AID In the article cited above, the Wall Street Journal claims that as of April 28th, "the EU has pledged or is in the process of committing $1.2 billion in assistance."


        2. However, according to the Economist, the total amount actually pledged (not just promised) was only $37 million (or 3% of the figure quoted by the Wall Street Journal). (May 8, 1999, "Guns or refugees--an unequal alliance?" page 50).

      2. SHELTERING REFUGEES By the UNHCR's account, there are 860,200 refugees outside Kosovo. Of these, the U.S. has offered to accept 20,000 (or 2%). However, as of May 5th, only 460 were actually being sheltered (The Economist, May 8,1999). And of these, as of May 12, only 102 were allowed to circulate freely within the U.S. (Nightline, May 12, 1999) the rest were detained at a military base, Fort Dix. (By June 7th, according to the UNHCR, the number of refugees being sheltered by the U.S. had risen to 5370.)
      3. PROCESSING ASYLUM APPLICATIONS Finally there are the numbers of asylum applications from Yugoslav citizens (including Kosovar Albanians). As the UNHCR reports (http://www.unhcr.ch/news/media/kostab3.htm) Eastern and Northern Europe had the following number of applicants for first four months of 1999
        4.               East. Eu.           North. Eu.
  January      600                 1310
  February     430                 1080
  March        930                 1360
  April       1530                  470

              East. Eu.           North. Eu.
  January      PPPPPP              PPPPPPPPPPPPP
  February     PPPP                PPPPPPPPPP
  March        PPPPPPPPP           PPPPPPPPPPPPPP

  April        PPPPPPPPPPPPPPP     PPPPP

  Each "P" stands for 100 persons. 
        While asylum applications in Eastern Europe jumped 134% over the pre-war monthly average for the year, asylum applications in Northern Europe actually declined 62% over what they were previous to the conflict. Of course, there are many possible explanations for this, but regardless of what these reasons are, the richer countries in Northern Europe and in America, many of which have been pushing hardest for a military solution, have done comparatively little* to solve the humanitarian crisis, which raises again the issue: what should the international community do?
          (*On this note, it should be mentioned that prior to the middle of May, all humanitarian assistance was directed towards refugees outside Kosovo. Of the 550,000 internally displaced civilians within Kosovo, nothing was done despite rumors of mass starvation. When the U.S. government was asked about the possibility of airdropping food into the region, it stated that such an action was of limited use and too risky. It remained for the private organization, the International Rescue Committee to undertake on its own these air drops which it began on May 28th.)
    1. For starters, the EU should keep its promise to rebuild Yugoslavia's economy (either that or it should be publically held accountable for reneging its promises). In addition, the U.S. should also contribute substantially towards this reconstruction as well. (Claims that the U.S. has already contributed enough by paying for military operations are probably not taking into account the fact that under the Burdensharing Amendment of 1998, most or roughly 75% of military costs associated with Operation Allied Force will be picked up by the allies, not the U.S.)
    2. At the beginning, reconstruction could start with the one territory not under Milosevic's control, namely Kosovo. Now comes the issue of who should be the beneficiaries of this economic redevelopment (i.e. who should be allowed to return to the region.)
    3. Finally as far as reconstruction aid is concerned, the EU (and the U.S.) should keep good on its promise to rebuild the rest of Yugoslavia once President Milosevic is no longer in command.

      4.  

       

    Of course, there are two clear rebuttals to this plan.
    1. The first is that Bosnian Serbs should be relocated to Bosnia, not to Kosovo. Although, this may be optimal, it is also so that this is not happening both from the sluggishness of the Yugoslav, Bosnian, and Croatian governments and the international community who could have done more to repatriate these people. Giving these former Bosnian Serb refugees a chance to move to area with an economic future is a good second option for four reasons listed above.
    2. The second more general rebuttal is that the U.S., NATO, and the EU are not responsible for rebuilding Yugoslavia and that this war was entirely the fault of President Milosevic who should bear the full cost of reconstruction. This may well be the case, but it also may well be a conveninent excuse to wiggle out of the difficult task of bringing Yugoslavia back into the European economy. As such, it asks and highlights why NATO and the US were ever engaged in this endeavor. Was it to show that "ethnic cleansing" should not ever happen; was it on behalf of those who were being "ethnically cleansed"? If so, then NATO and the US need to return these refugees (as well as refugees from the Bosnian War) not just to their homes but to some vestige of an economic future instead of disease and starvation this coming winter.


      3. If not, then the NATO and the U.S. should be held publically accountable for the fact that that the well-being of the Kosovar Albanians was never their primary goal.

      As the peace plan becomes more and more a possibility, what's important to keep in mind is that if this war was fought on behalf of the Kosovar Albanians, then this war has not been won yet and it still remains to be lost. As the situation now stands, President Milosevic has succeeded in utterly devastating the economic future of the Kosovar Albanians. What NATO has truly accomplished is simply devastating the economic future of all the other Yugoslav citizens (as well as other economies in the Balkans). Without real economic assistance, President Milosevic's goal to impoverish and persecute the Kosovar Albanians will have become a reality regardless of NATO's pronouncements of victory or the EU's yet undelivered promises of economic assistance.
       
       

  10. REMOVING DEPLETED URANIUM


    11. Along with the issue of money for reconstruction, there is the crucial issue of removing the depleted uranium and decontaminating Yugoslavia. Here are three reasons of self-interest why NATO and the U.S. should begin this project as soon as possible.

    1. NATO and the U.S. by firing munitions made of depleted uranium In Yugoslavia (as well as Iraq) have set a certain precedent for the use of an entity which the UN in 1996 labelled a weapon of mass destruction (the UN also called for weapons made of depleted uranium to be banned). The fact that these weapons have already been used in a theatre of war cannot be undone, obviously. But if NATO and the US were to clean up and remove these weapons from the landscape, it would set an important precedent that the use of such weapons obligated the military power that used them to remove them afterwards. (This can be done as Scott Peterson's articles in the Christian Science Monitor note. Depleted uranium weapons, which had been fired, were removed from practice ranges in Indiana.) This is important because as matters now stand, there is nothing to keep countries such as Russia, China or Iraq from constructing weapons made of depleted uranium, using them, and then leaving them to contaminate the environment for billions of years.
    2. NATO and U.S. troops will necessarily be in Kosovo and will be exposed to depleted uranium radiation. This is not insignificant as Scott Peterson reported. (In Iraq, battlefields had radiation levels 35 times the normal level.) For the benefit of these troops, it would simply be best to decontaminate the entire landscape.
    3. Finally, there is the issue of liability of U.S. companies which have constructed these weapons. Although one might consider it unlikely that Serbian or Kosovar Albanian citizens would be able to mount a successful lawsuit against these companies, consider the possibility that French, German, or English peacekeepers upon exposure to depleted uranium, could file a class action suit which could, if the U.S. were to side with the American companies, lead to trade conflicts. Given the economic unity provided by pan-European organizations such as the European Union, trade conflicts would not be beneficial to the U.S.

      4.  

       

  11. THREE UNRESOLVED ISSUES AFTER THE BOMBING
    1. This is a question that was raised before, but which is particularly important to ask now that the bombing campaign appears to be over. How many people were killed (and injured) by
      1. NATO bombing,
      2. the official Serbian military and police,
      3. more loosely organized paramilitary units including the KLA?
      Recently, the figure of 10,000 estimated deaths caused by Serbian forces was widely reported by the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the BBC. There is one of two possibilities to explain the fact that this figure has been mentioned over and over. One is that all these news sources are independently investigating this question and have arrived at the same number. The second possibility, of course, is that all of these news organizations are using the same source and that there is no corroboration occurring here. Unfortunately, it is difficult to tell which of these explanantions is correct. An article in the BBC (I will try to get the link soon) gave the impression that this estimate was an extrapolation based on a number of mass graves that had been thus far uncovered. Although precise numbers for these mass graves were given, the method of extrapolation wasn't explained.

      Some answers to these questions have been posed by the most recent (mid-June) issue of the Economist which reports the following casualty figures:

      1. Serbian Civilians: 2,000
      2. Serbian Military: 6,000
      3. KLA ?
      4. Kosovo Albanians: 100,000
      There are two things that should be mentioned about these estimates.
      1. One is that the Economist's estimate for the number of Kosovar Albanians killed is ten times the other figure of 10,000. Therefore, one might ask where this substantial difference is coming from.
      2. The second is that it is important to know how of the Kosovar Albanian deaths are civilians and how many are KLA troops. The Economist estimates that 75% of Serb casualties were military personnel. Were most of the casualties suffered by the Kosovar Albanians KLA troops as well? How can one tell? How is this matter being handled by investigators?
      In addition, it should be noted how the figure of 2,000 Serbian civilian deaths compares to NATO estimates which were given during the bombing campaign. From March 24 to late April, NATO estimated its bombing had killed 100 Serbian civilians. Extrapolating this estimate to the 78 days of bombing (i.e. multiply by 78/35), one arrives at an estimate of 223 deaths. Perhaps a histogram might be useful here again. Each "P" stands for 45 deaths. 
      NATO's:                            PPPPP 
estimate

Economist's:                       PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP
estimate
      There are a number of reasons that might explain this discrepancy. One is that the bombing campaign increased tenfold in the last half. The second is that the Economist is overestimating. The third is that NATO decided to underestimate the death totals caused by its bombs until the bombing campaign had stopped. Consider how public support for the bombing would have been helped or hindered by an estimate in late April that 800 Serbian civilians had already been killed by NATO bombs.
    2. How is the KLA being "demilitarized?" and are the Yugoslav forces exiting Kosovo? The current peace agreeement calls for the removal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and for the demilitarization of the KLA. Therefore, two questions to ask are whether Yugoslav forces are in fact exiting Kosovo and how the KLA is being demilitarized. Many articles have reported that the withdrawal of official Yugoslav forces is proceeding according to the schedule set up. However, this doesn't answer the issue of whether paramilitary and unofficial forces are still in place. Clearly this is a vital issue if the former inhabitants are to return to the region.


      3. Second is the issue of demilitarizing the KLA as called for in the peace agreement. The most basic question to ask is, "what does "demilitarization" mean? Ultimately, it means disarming, but what arms are to be taken from the KLA? Rocket launchers, anti-tank weaponry, machine guns, handguns? This issue is important because it affects what the ethnic demographics of the region are likely to be. NATO Commander Michael Jackson has urged ethnic Serbs in Kosovo to remain in the region. However, it is clear that this population will stay only if it feels reasonably secure from attacks by the KLA.

    3. Finally, there is the matter of war crimes investigations. Some crucial questions that should be asked and issues that should be considered are
      1. Who is being investigated and how is information being gathered up? Are members of the KLA being interviewed for testimony? What about members of the Serbian military? What about the U.S. military?
      2. In addition, one might ask who the investigators are. Are any ethnic Albanians included, what about ethnic Serbians? What sort of neutrality can be guaranteed by these investigators?
      3. Regarding the return of the refugees to Kosovo, could this hinder the gathering of evidence?
      4. What is the U.S. contributing in resources and money to the cost of these investigations?
  12. LETTER FROM THE WHITE HOUSEAs some of you may recall, earlier in the bombing campaign, I sent out a note to the mathgrad listserver asking whether anyone would be interested in receiving a petition on the Balkans. Here is an update on that. There were eight responses--two from American citizens and six from foreign nationals. Actually, there was one more from an American citizen.


    13. The following is the a reply I received from President Clinton. I am including it here for two reasons: i) the first being that as an official document, it illustrates the particular interpretation of the war which President Clinton wishes to present to the public, ii) the second is that there are a number of statements which deserve further comment and which serve well as a springboard for further discussion.

    Therefore, while I appreciate the fact that the White House staff took time to mail back their letter on Kosovo, I also think that the letter deserves further response. Thus, I have appended some comments to the President's reply which is reprinted in its entirety below. (Click here to see the letter as it was sent. Whitehouse Letter.)

    THE WHITE HOUSE
    WASHINGTON

    June 15, 1999

    Mr. Ken Takata
    Post Office Box 2221
    Oak Park, IL 60303

    Dear Ken:

    Thank you for sharing your views with Hillary about the Kosovo conflict. She has asked me to respond on her behalf.

    As you know, the United States -- together with our NATO allies and Russia -- worked to forge a peaceful resolution to the situation in Kosovo.

    Despite our repeated efforts [at diplomacy] and the willingness of Kosovar leaders to accept a peaceful settlement, Serbia's leader launched a merciless attack on innocent and defenseless Kosovars -- killing thousands in a ruthless crusade of ethnic cleansing.

    It was only after our attempts at diplomacy failed

    and Serbia's crimes against civilians in Kosovo escalated that the United States and our NATO allies chose military action. Our mission in Kosovo is clear: to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's purpose to that Serbian leaders understand the imperative of changing their course; to deter an even more brutal offensive against civilians in Kosovo; and to seriously damage the capacity of the Serbian military to harm the people of Kosovo. Mr. Milosevic can end this conflict at any time by withdrawing his military, police, and paramilitary forces from Kosovo, accepting the deployment of an international security force, and allowing the unconditional return of all refugees and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid.

    Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative. It is also vitally important to our national interests. Twice before in this century, this region of Europe has been at the center of the world war. Our action now will prevent a wider war in the future in which American lives and resources could be at even greater risk. In addition, our ability to secure peace in our own region of the world has been largely due to the strength and integrity of NATO. Now more than ever, it is vital that we stand by our allies and protect the credibility of this institution [NATO].

    Finally, to secure a peaceful and prosperous future for the next generation of Americans, we need a Europe that is stable, free, and undivided -- a Europe that shares our fundamental values of equality, justice, and respect for human rights. Restoring peace to the Balkans is a integral part of that objective.

    As we continue working to uphold America's values, protect our interests, and promote stability, I assume you that my Administration will carefully consider your views.

    Sincerely,

    Bill Clinton

  13. INVESTIGATING WAR CRIMES"If our government engages in war crimes, it's at least as important--and I would agree with you, more important--that we report the war crime." --CBS Evening News anchor, Dan Rather, at the National Press Club on June 25, 1999


    14. "...the Prosecutor [of the International Criminal Tribunal at the Hague] is bound by the Statutes (Article 18.1) to conduct an investigation [of war crimes] 'on the basis of information obtained from any source.' " --Michael Mandel, Professor at York University

    These two quotes serve as a preamble to this next section on the investigation of war crimes. Included are a brief introduction to the issue and simple ways that any person can push for the investigation of war crimes.

    1. What is a war crime? War crimes are actions meeting a certain threshold of brutality and violence which have been committed (in the context of war) against military personnel, prisoners of war, and civilians. For example, the use of chemical weapons against any of these three groups would constitute a war crime and would be prosecutable as such. As the Geneva Conventions of 1949 outline, certain standards of medical care and food and housing are to be provided for prisoners of war. Therefore, torture of POW's would constitute a war crime. Regarding civilians, the Geneva Conventions defines the following to be examples of war crimes:
      1. wilful killing,
      2. wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
      3. extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
      Of course, this is not a comprehensive list of all activities that could be considered to be war crimes, but it gives a basic idea of the type of actions that fall under this rubric. A more complete description and definition could be found in the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
    2. Who could have committed war crimes? Among the entities which might have carried out war crimes are the following:
      1. Serbian military, examples: mass killing, expulsion, rape, destruction of property and robbery.
      2. Serbian paramilitary and police, examples: mass killing, expulsion, rape, destruction of property and robbery.
      3. KLA, examples: killing, expulsion, rape and persecution of ethnic Serb and Roma populations, destruction of properties of these ethnicities, extortion and torture of KLA members, harassment in forced recruiting of new KLA members.
      4. NATO, examples: excessive destruction of property, not justified by military necessity and excessive killing of civilians, use of poisonous weapons.
      5. Russian Army, examples: (I have no information about possible war crimes committed, but that does not mean these did not occur. Like the other entities listed here, the Russian Army has been active in Kosovo although in much smaller numbers.) 
    3. Who is in charge of investigating this? Some of the organizations involved are the following:
      1. the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), located at the Hague, formerly headed by Prosecutor Louise Arbour,
      2. the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which maintains a subdivision called the Kosovo Verification Mission at http://www.osce.org/e/kvm- fact.htm (The OSCE was in Kosovo prior to the bombing campaign in March 1999),
      3. the World Court (a subdivision of the UN),
      4. human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International,
      5. the American Bar Association,
      6. groups such as Lawyers Without Borders,
      7. the FBI,
      8. occupying military units and forensic scientists from NATO countries.
    4. How are they investigating this? One technique involves gathering forensic evidence regarding who died and how the victims died. The second technique concerns interviewing possible eyewitnesses to the crime, sorting these through a database and crosschecking these to see if different eyewitnesses corroborate each other's stories.
    5. Is there any documentable bias to these investigators? (or is there any reason to suspect that these investigators might not act impartially?)
      1. Although the FBI and forensic scientists from NATO countries are technically capable of gathering evidence, there is the basic question, "Is there a potential conflict of interest here in which one of the possible defendants in a war crimes trial is in fact combing the crime scene for evidence?" This leads necessarily to the following questions: "Is it reasonable to expect any country (or any entity) acting out of its own self- interest to incriminate itself?" and "Could such an entity be trusted to gather and report evidence which would incriminate NATO and their own countries?"
      2. There have been questions as to whether the Hague (ICTY) itself has acted impartially. In specific, there is this persistent issue of unequal indictments.


        3. During the Bosnian War, the heads of states of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia (Tujman, Izebegovic, and Milosevic) were all responsible for widespread atrocities and war crimes. Despite this, only Milosevic has been indicted. One rebuttal could be that Milosevic was responsible for more war crimes and thus, he is the one who is being indicted. However, the ICTY has no obligation to pick out simply the worst offender; instead, it is supposed to investigate and indict anyone who committed war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Another rebuttal could be that there are political reasons why all three heads of state in the former Yugoslavia cannot be indicted. But the ICTY is not supposed to make its decisions on the basis of what is or isn't politically convenient.

        Instead the Prosecutor is bound by the Statutes regarding the ICTY (Article 18.1) to conduct an investigation "on the basis of information obtained from any source." As a result, there have been attempts by various groups to argue that NATO's bombing campaign constitutes a war crime for a number of reasons, but this is the subject of the next section.
         
         

    6. Determining whether NATO committed war crimes


      7. Various persons such as Michael Mandel and Alexander Lykourezos have advanced the argument that NATO's bombing campaign constitutes war crimes for a number of reasons, among these being that it proceeded without U.N. authorization and that it involved "wilful killing, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity." These arguments (along with precise lists of damage caused by the bombings) are presented at the following websites:

      1. Alexander Lykourezos (It should be noted that Mr. Lykourezos has been hired as legal counsel for General Mladic, perhaps the most wanted person on the Hague's list of indicted war criminals),
      2. Michael Mandel.
      The argument I am going to present is much more limited and focuses on specific incidents rather than the entire bombing campaign. This is for two reasons, the first being that general argument has already been advanced, the second being that some of the specific incidents are not mentioned in detail in the documents prepared by Michael Mandel or Alexander Lykourezos, and thus, may be useful in supplementing the investigation. (Included are examples of letters and petitions which call for further investigation.)
      1. Bridge at Varvarin


        2. NATO's bombing of this bridge has been discussed in detail before, but perhaps a brief synopsis of the events is in order. At 1 p.m. on Sunday, May 30, 1999, NATO planes struck a bridge at Varvarin at least twice killing at least 9 civilians. The question is whether this event constitutes a war crime as defined by the phrase, "wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity."

        A rebuttal would be (as Jamie Shea and Colonel Konrad Freitag have responded) that the bridge could have been used by Serb military forces and was, therefore, part of the military infrastructure and a legitimate target. This, however, does not answer why the bridge needed to be destroyed when civilian traffic was likely to be at its peak (at 1 p.m. on a religious holiday).

        Therefore, it would seem to be a reasonable question to ask the ICTY to investigate what military reason compelled NATO to destroy this bridge when it did. Also worth knowing is who ordered the destruction of the bridge, and whether the fact that May 30, 1999 was a significant religious holiday with heavy civilian traffic was considered.

        PETITION

        1. Click here to see a letter to the ICTY asking them to investigate NATO's bombing of the bridge at Varvarin, and click here to display a window to e-mail this request to the ICTY (a minimal amount of cut-and-paste will be required to transfer the letter to the window).
        2. Click here to see a letter addressed to CBS asking them to investigate NATO's bombing of the bridge at Varvarin, and click here to display a window to e-mail this request to CBS (a minimal amount of cut-and-paste will be required to transfer the letter to the window) or to use their own feedback form here. Note: CBS Evening News staff has suggested that faxing or mailing your comments increases the likelihood that they will be read.
      2. Pancevo Oil Refinery


        3. Again, NATO's bombing of the Pancevo Oil Refinery has been discussed in detail. However, some additional information has come to light so a brief synopsis is warranted. On April 17 to 18, 1999, NATO bombed the Pancevo Oil Refinery (despite warnings that these bombings would produce a large environmental disaster 10 miles away from Belgrade's 2 million inhabitants). As a result of the bombings, the capabilities of the unit were destroyed and large amounts of carcinogenic substances such as vinyl chloride monomer were released into the Danube River and the air as well. Again, the question is whether this event constitutes a war crime as defined by the phrase, "wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity."

        A rebuttal would be that the Pancevo Oil Refinery produced materials relevant to the operation of Serbia's military, and that disabling the plant was warranted as a military maneuver.

        However, according to a press release issued by Dr. Gordana Vunjak from MIT, the water vapor unit at the plant was destroyed first, thus disabling any further production. After this, the unit which contained the VCM was destroyed, thus, causing the environmental problems mentioned above. The question is whether the destruction of the VCM container was "justified by military necessity," especially when one considers that a metropolitan population of 2 million civilians would suffer exposure to carcinogens in the event of bombing the VCM container.

        Again, worthwhile questions to ask in such an investigation would be what the precise chain of command was regarding these particular bombings.

        PETITION

        1. Click here to see a letter to the ICTY asking them to investigate NATO's bombing of the Pancevo Oil Refinery, and click here to display a window to e- mail this request to the ICTY (a minimal amount of cut-and-paste will be required to transfer the letter to the window).
        2. Click here to see a letter addressed to CBS asking them to investigate NATO's bombing of the Pancevo Oil Refinery, and click here to display a window to e-mail this request to CBS (a minimal amount of cut-and-paste will be required to transfer the letter to the window) or to use their own feedback form here. Note: CBS Evening News staff has suggested that faxing or mailing your comments increases the likelihood that they will be read.
      Why CBS?

       A reasonable question to ask at this point might be, "why are letters being sent to CBS in particular?" According to a Media Alert by FAIR (Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting), CBS Evening News anchor, Dan Rather, recently stated the aforementioned quote, "If our government engages in war crimes it's at least as important--and I would agree with you, more important--that we report the war crime." (The full transcript of the interchange can be seen at http://www.fair.org/activism/cbs- warcrimes.html.) Therefore, FAIR has suggested that viewers contact CBS to state an interest in seeing stories which investigate war crimes. I have simply taken the next logical step and provided two specific suggestions based on the following assumption: on the chance that Mr. Rather is indeed serious about investigating whether NATO has committed war crimes, it seems worthwhile to forward information about possible leads.

      Some comments about methodologies and some other possibilities to explore

      Finally, it should be noted that in these two instances (the Varvarin bridge and Pancevo Oil Refinery), the arguments that war crimes may have been committed by NATO depend very much on specific information regarding each incident, such as what targets were hit, in what order, and at what time.

      Therefore, it may be worthwhile to furnish both the ICTY and various media (such as possibly CBS) with information and leads which might answer whether or not NATO did in fact commit war crimes in specific instances. The preceding two examples are simply instances that I have found. But the list is, of course, not meant to be comprehensive. Readers who have other information should direct it towards the ICTY, which is bound by the Statutes regarding it to conduct an investigation "on the basis of information obtained from any source."

       Finally, it is worth mentioning that much of potential evidence of war crimes committed by NATO is not perishable. (To read an article detailing the potentially long lasting consequences of the bombing at the Pancevo Oil Refinery, click here. This is particularly true with respect to NATO's use of cluster bombs and depleted uranium. Cluster bombs have been discussed earlier, but two recent developments should be mentioned. One is that the use of cluster bombs is finally what led former President Carter (in an unprecedented move for a former President) to criticize the foreign policy of a current President.. Former President Carter's argument was that the use of cluster bombs was both unnecessary militarily and unnecessarily hazardous for civilians. This fact has been underlined by the deaths of two British soldiers who were killed shortly after the bombing stopped when they accidentally detonated one of the cluster bombs which NATO had dropped but which hadn't yet exploded.

      Regarding depleted uranium, because of its enormous half-life (~4.5 billion), evidence of its presence will be measurable for the forseeable future.

      The question remains whether the use of DU munitions as weapons of mass destruction (as the UN has defined them) constitutes a war crime.

    7. Determining whether other entities committed war crimes


      8. Evidence of killings and burnings are closely linked with specific locations. The precise troop movements of all ground forces in this conflict are relevant as they tell us who could have been and who could not have been responsible for these actions. Information about the whereabouts of the Serbian military, paramilitary, police and KLA at specific times is therefore crucial to the war crimes investigation. Also, it is worth mentioning that war crimes can be committed against one's own internal troops (including the KLA, the Serbian military, paramilitary, police, and NATO). Instances of retribution, torture, and internecine murder are also vital to the war crimes investigation.

  14. $5 MILLION BOUNTY ON MILOSEVICNumerous media reported on June 24, 1999 that the United States was now offering a reward of $5 million on information leading to the arrest of President Milosevic.


    15. There are two possible spins that could be placed on this story.
     
     

    1. One is that the U.S. is making an effort to bring those persons indicted by the Hague for war crimes to the International War Crimes tribunal, something which the U.S. had not pursued with any vigor during or after the Bosnian War. (Reputed war criminals are often seen at close contact but rarely apprehended by troops stationed there.)
    2. The second is that this $5 million bounty is in fact a cover which obscures the real contribution that the U.S. is or isn't making towards war crimes investigations. The argument goes something like this: given that President Milosevic is now more popular than he was before the war started, given that he now has a firmer grip on the media and that the opposition parties do not mount a serious challenge, given that he rarely if ever, needs to appear in public and that he can maintain tight security, it is hardly likely that he will be arrested any time soon. Which means that this $5 million bounty exists mostly as a promise (cf. the U.S.'s promise to accept 20,000 Kosovar Albanians) rather than an actual allocation of funds.


      3. Now consider that war crimes investigation is in fact a time consuming and costly endeavor for obvious reasons. Forensic scientists must search through and gather all appropriate evidence. Interviews must be undertaken and collated to verify and corroborate stories. Given that there are over 860,000 refugees, this is, to put it midly, a massive undertaking. The real question on the issue of war crimes investigation is not whether the U.S. is making some future promise to pay $5 million, but whether it is currently willing to commit the millions of dollars that would be necessary to carry out thorough investigations.

    Therefore, the obvious question, which I mentioned in an earlier section is precisely how much is the U.S. actually contributing (not just promising to commit) to this venture?

    If anyone has information on this issue, I would be very interested in seeing this. 
     
     










































copyright 1999 Ken Takata