Scott spectral gaps for trees are bounded

Matthew Harrison-Trainor and J. Thomas Kim Harrison-Trainor was partially supported by a Sloan Research Fellowship and by the National Science Foundation under Grant DMS-2452105 and DMS-2419591/DMS-2153823. Thomas Kim was supported as an REU student by the National Science Foundation under grant DMS-2419591.
Abstract

Given a Borel class of trees, we show that there is a tree in that class whose Scott sentence is not too much more complicated than the definition of the class. In particular, if the class is definable by a Πα sentence, then there is a model of Scott rank at most α+2. This gives another proof—and one that does not require first proving Vaught’s conjecture for trees—of the fact that trees are not faithfully Borel complete.

1 Introduction

Given a countable mathematical structure 𝒜, such as a graph, group, or linear order, Scott [SCO65] showed that there is a sentence φ of the infinitary logic ω1ω that characterizes that structure up to isomorphism among countable structures in the sense that for countable structures , we have φ if and only if 𝒜. Such a sentence is called a Scott sentence for 𝒜. We can measure the complexity of describing 𝒜 up to isomorphism by assigning to 𝒜 an ordinal-valued Scott rank. There are a number of almost but not quite equivalent definitions of Scott rank. The one that we will use is due to Montalbán [MON15] and defines the Scott rank of 𝒜 to be the least α such that 𝒜 has a Πα+1 Scott sentence. This definition is particularly robust, and measures in addition the complexity of describing the automorphism orbits of the structure.

Given an ω1ω sentence φ, we think of φ as a theory defining a class of models, and we ask what the possible Scott ranks of the models of φ might be.

Definition 1.1.

Let φ be an ω1ω sentence. The Scott spectrum of φ is the set

SS(φ)={αω1|there is 𝒜φ of Scott rank α}.

In [HAR18] the first author showed that there are theories φ which have low complexity, but all of whose models have high complexity. For example, for any α, there is a Π2 sentence φ all of whose models have Scott rank α. Moreover, such an example could be found within any universal class of structures (see [HKS+02] and Chapter VI of [MON21]), such as graphs or fields. On the other hand, in [4], the first author and Gonzalez showed that if a Πα sentence φ extends the axioms of linear orders then there is a model of φ of Scott rank at most α+4. This was the first non-trivial case in which such a result is known.

In this paper we consider the case of (simple) trees, which are rooted connected acyclic graphs. We use the language tree={r,P} where r is a constant standing for the root and P is the parent relation, that is, P(x)=y means that y is the parent of x. (We write the parent relation using functional notation for clarity, but formally we take our language to be a relational language so that we can define the back-and-forth relations in the standard way.) Our motivation for considering trees arises from faithful Borel embeddings, a topic somewhat connected to Vaught’s conjecture. Steel [STE78] proved that Vaught’s conjecture is true for linear orders and trees,111And indeed for a more general definition of trees than the one that we consider here. while of course Vaught’s conjecture is open in general. While linear orders and trees are Borel complete [FS89], this is not enough to imply that Vaught’s conjecture is true in general. The reason is that, as shown by Gao [GAO01], linear orders and trees are not faithfully Borel complete, that is, the saturation of the image of a Borel reduction from graphs to linear orders or trees cannot be Borel. For classes of structures which are faithfully Borel complete, including for example graphs, Vaught’s conjecture for that class would imply the full Vaught’s conjecture. As proved in [4], having bounded Scott spectral gaps implies that a class is not faithfully Borel complete, and in a way which does not require first verifying Vaught’s conjecture for that class (whereas Gao’s argument went through proving a strengthening of Vaught’s conjecture for linear orders and trees). A central open question is whether Boolean algebras are faithfully Borel complete and whether Vaught’s conjecture is true for them, and so studying Scott spectral gaps for Boolean algebras would be a way of studying the former question without having to first resolve the latter. We refer the reader to [4] for a more detailed discussion of these connections.

In this context, it is natural to try to prove that Scott spectral gaps are bounded for trees. This is the main result of this paper.

Theorem 1.2.

Given a satisfiable Πα sentence φ of trees, there is a tree 𝒜φ with a Πα+3 Scott sentence and hence Scott rank at most α+2.

The high-level structure of the argument is similar to the case of linear orders, though of course the details differ. In particular, the reader will note that we obtain a better bound for trees than that for linear orders. While this paper is mathematically self-contained, our explanatory discussion of material that is analogous to that appearing in [4], especially that in Section 2, will be brief. We refer the reader to [4] for a more detailed development.

As for linear orders, we also obtain non-trivial lower bounds, but there remains a gap between the lower bounds and the upper bounds.

Theorem 1.3.

There is a Π2 theory of trees such that no model of φ has a Σ3 Scott sentence, and hence every model has Scott rank at least 3.

2 Back-and-forth relations and hierarchies of formulas

In this section we outline the general background needed to carry out the argument. Throughout this paper, all structures will be countable and all languages relational. Central to the ideas of the argument are the asymmetric back-and-forth relations.

Definition 2.1.

The asymmetric back-and-forth relations α, for α<ω1, are defined by:

  • (,a¯)0(𝒩,b¯) if a¯ and b¯ satisfy the same quantifier-free formulas from among the first |a¯|-many formulas.

  • For α>0, (,a¯)α(𝒩,b¯) if for each β<α and d¯𝒩 there is c¯ such that (𝒩,b¯d¯)β(,a¯c¯).

We define a¯αb¯ if a¯αb¯ and b¯αa¯.

The interpretation of (,a¯)α(𝒩,b¯) is that in the back-and-forth game between and 𝒩, starting with the partial isomorphism a¯b¯ and with the first player Spoiler to play next in 𝒩, the second player Duplicator can play without losing along an ordinal clock α. Recall that if Duplicator can continue playing forever, then 𝒩.

The asymmetric back-and-forth relations can be characterized in relation to the quantifier complexity hierarchy Σα/Πα of ω1ω-formulas.

Theorem 2.2 (Karp [KAR65]).

For any α1, structures 𝒜 and , and tuples a¯𝒜 and b¯, the following are equivalent:

  1. (1)

    (𝒜,a¯)α(,b¯).

  2. (2)

    Every Πα formula true about a¯ in 𝒜 is true about b¯ in .

  3. (3)

    Every Σα formula true about b¯ in is true about a¯ in 𝒜.

However, as shown in [4], there is no Πα formula defining the set of b¯ such that (𝒜,a¯)α(,b¯). Instead, as there, we will make use of the hierarchies 𝔄α and 𝔈α as introduced in [1].

Definition 2.3.

All connectives below are countable.

  • 𝔄1:=Π1

  • 𝔈1:=Σ1

  • 𝔄α:= closure of β<α𝔈¯β under and

  • 𝔈α:= closure of β<α𝔄¯β under and

  • 𝔈¯α:= closure of 𝔈α under ,

  • 𝔄¯α:= closure of 𝔄α under ,

Each 𝔄α formula can be written in the form

iIy¯iφi(x¯,y¯i)

where the formulas φi are 𝔈¯β for some β<α, and similarly a 𝔈α formula can be written in the form

iIy¯iφi(x¯,y¯i)

where each φi is 𝔄¯β for some β<α.

The key difference between these two hierarchies is that a formula of the form is only 𝔄2 while being Π4. The two main facts we use are stated in the following lemmas.

Lemma 2.4 (Chen, Gonzalez, and Harrison-Trainor [1]).

For any α1, structures 𝒜 and , and tuples a¯𝒜 and b¯, the following are equivalent:

  1. (1)

    (𝒜,a¯)α(,b¯).

  2. (2)

    Every 𝔄α formula true about a¯ in 𝒜 is true about b¯ in .

  3. (3)

    Every 𝔈α formula true about b¯ in is true about a¯ in 𝒜.

Lemma 2.5 (Chen, Gonzalez, and Harrison-Trainor [1]).

Let be a countable language and 𝒜 be a countable -structure. For each a¯A and nonzero α<ω1 there is an 𝔄α formula ψa¯,𝒜,α such that for any countable -structure and b¯,

ψa¯,𝒜,α(b¯)(,b¯)α(𝒜,a¯).

3 Back-and-forth relations and trees

A common assumption when working with back-and-forth relations and trees is that whenever a tuple a¯ of a tree T appears, it is closed under the parent relation and so is a subtree of T. We will make this assumption, which we will often abbreviate by saying that “a¯ is a finite subtree of T”. In the context of this paper, this assumption can be justified by the following lemma.

Lemma 3.1.

Let S and T be trees and a¯S and b¯T. Let a¯S consist of a¯ and all of its ancestors, and similarly for b¯ and b¯ in T, with both tuples listed in corresponding order. Then for any α>0, (S,a¯)α(T,b¯) if and only if (S,a¯)α(T,b¯).

Proof.

If (S,a¯)α(T,b¯) then (S,a¯)α(T,b¯) as a¯ and b¯ are subtuples of a¯ and b¯ respectively. On the other hand, suppose that (S,a¯)α(T,b¯). We know that if Tψ(b¯) then Tψ(a¯) for any Σα formula ψ(x¯). In particular, if η(y¯,b¯) is a finitary quantifier-free formula defining b¯ with respect to b¯, then Tη(a¯,a¯) and moreover a¯ is the only such tuple. We must argue that if Tψ(b¯) then Sψ(a¯) for any Σα formula ψ(x¯). Suppose Tψ(b¯). Then Ty¯[η(y¯,b¯)ψ(y¯)] so Sy¯[η(y¯,a¯)ψ(y¯)]. Since η(y¯,a¯) is a defining formula for a¯, we see Tψ(a¯). ∎

For linear orders, the analysis in [4] breaks the linear order up into intervals. The point was that the back-and-forth relations on linear orders can be broken up into the back-and-forth relations on intervals as follows. Given linear orders 𝒜 and , and elements a1<<an and b1<<bn, we have (a¯,𝒜)α(b¯,) if and only if each of the corresponding intervals in 𝒜 and are related in the same way, that is (,a1)α(,b1), (a1,a2)α(b1,b2), and so on. We must identify an analogous way of breaking trees up into their constituent parts. We do this as follows.

Definition 3.2.

Let a¯=(a1,,an) be a finite subtree of T. Define Ta¯ai, the descendant tree of ai avoiding a¯, to be the tree consisting of ai and its descendants that are not in a¯, with ai as its root.

a0a1a2a3a4a5a6Ta¯a0Ta¯a3Ta¯a4a4

Note that the trees Ta¯ai are all disjoint from each other, and that the isomorphism type of T is determined by the finite tree a¯ together with the isomorphism types of Ta¯ai. Ta¯ai can be defined by the following Σ1 formula ηi(x;ai,a¯):

ηi(x,ai,a¯):=n=0y0,,yn[ai=y0P(y1)=y0P(yn)=yn1yn=x(jiy1aj)].

With the formula η(x,yi,y¯) we may relativize a formula φ to a tree Ta¯ai. We obtain a formula φx¯xi of the same complexity such that if a¯T is a finite subtree of T then

Tφa¯aiTa¯aiφ.

We do this by replacing each quantifier x in φ with x(η(x,ai,a¯)) and each quantifier x in φ with x(ηi(x,ai,a¯)). Since η(x,y,z¯) is a Σ1 formula, φ and φa¯ai are the same complexity Σα/Πα or 𝔈α/𝔄α.

Remark 3.3.

Corresponding to the fact that a subinterval of a subinterval of a linear order is a subinterval of that linear order, we have the following fact. Given a¯ a subtree of T, and b¯=(b¯1,,b¯n) where each b¯i is a subtree of Ta¯ai containing the roots ai, note that (Ta¯ai)bi¯bi,j=Ta¯bi¯bi,j=Tb¯bi,j. Note that each entry of a¯ is contained in b¯, so that for example a¯b¯i has ai appearing twice, which we will allow to avoid cumbersome notation. We will sometimes write Ta¯b¯bi,j for Tb¯bi,j.

To see that the Ta¯ai are the right analogue of intervals in a linear order, we prove the following fact about how back-and-forth relations between tuples in trees break up into back-and-forth relations between their descendant trees.

Lemma 3.4.

Let A and B be trees and let a¯A and b¯B be finite subtrees. Let α1. Then (A,a¯)α(B,b¯) if and only if a¯treeb¯ and Aa¯aiαBb¯bi for each i. Here a¯treeb¯ means a¯ and b¯ are isomorphic as trees.

Proof.

First suppose (A,a¯)α(B,b¯). Clearly a¯treeb¯. Given i, suppose that Bb¯biφ where φ is Πα. Then Bφb¯bi, so Aφa¯ai, meaning Aa¯aiφ. Thus Aa¯aiαBb¯bi.

Now suppose a¯treeb¯ and Aa¯aiαBb¯bi for each i. Let β<α and c¯A. Without loss of generality let c¯=(c¯1,c¯2,,c¯n) where ci¯Aa¯ai for each i. Then there are di¯Bb¯bi such that (Aa¯ai,ci¯)β(Bb¯bi,di¯). We may assume that the c¯i are subtrees of Aa¯ai containing ai and similarly for d¯i and Bb¯bi. Then, by the induction hypothesis we have (Aa¯ai)c¯ici,jβ(Bb¯bi)d¯idi,j which is the same as Aa¯c¯ci,jβBb¯d¯di,j by Remark 3.3. Then—again, by the induction hypothesis—we have (A,a¯c¯)β(B,b¯d¯) and thus (A,a¯)α(B,b¯). ∎

The following lemma is a syntactic version of this previous fact. As with linear orders, the lemma is only true for 𝔈α sentences, and not for Σα sentences. (A counterexample arises from the sentence defined in Proposition 5.1, with the proof being similar to the corresponding lemma from [4].)

Lemma 3.5.

Let T be a tree and a¯T be a finite subtree containing the root. Suppose Tφ(a¯) where φ is a 𝔈α formula. Then there are 𝔈α sentences θi such that Ta¯aiθi and if S is a tree and b¯S has b¯treea¯ and Sb¯biθi then Sφ(b¯).

Proof.

Without loss of generality let φ(x¯) be of the form φ(x¯):=k<ωy¯ψk(x¯,y¯) where each ψk is 𝔄¯β for some β<α. Since Tφ(a¯) there is some c¯T and k<ω such that Tψk(a¯,c¯). Without loss of generality suppose c¯=(c¯1,c¯2,,c¯n) where ci¯ is a subtree of Ta¯ai containing ai. Note that following Remark 3.3 we have (Ta¯ai)ci¯ci,j=Tc¯ci,j. By Lemma 2.5 there are 𝔄β sentences χi,j such that Sχi,j if and only if SβTa¯c¯ci,j. For each i define

θi:=x¯[x¯treeci¯jχi,jx¯xj]

where x¯treeci¯ stands for the infinitary quantifier-free formula with free variables x¯ which expresses that the parent relations on x¯ is the same as on c¯ after identifying the roots. Then Ta¯aiθi. Suppose S is a tree and b¯S is a finite subtree containing the root with b¯treea¯ and Sb¯biθi for each i. Let di¯ be the witness of θi in Sb¯bi. Then Sb¯d¯di,jβTa¯c¯ci,j, so by Lemma 3.4 (S,d¯)β(T,c¯). Thus Sψk(b¯,d¯) for d¯=(d¯1,,d¯n) and therefore Sφ(b¯). ∎

4 Proof of the main theorem

In this section we prove the main theorem, which is that given a Πα sentence φ of trees, there is a tree Tφ such that T has a Πα+3 Scott sentence and hence has Scott rank at most α+2. As in [4], since each Πα sentence is 𝔈α+1, after replacing α+1 by α it suffices to assume that φ is 𝔈α and show that is has a model with a Πα+2 Scott sentence and hence Scott rank at most α+1. This sentence φ will be fixed for the remainder of this section.

The overall strategy is as follows. We use a Henkin construction to build a model of φ which is generic in a certain sense. Intuitively, one should think that we try to make any two tuples different from each other, if possible, by a 𝔈α sentence. If this fails, then we will try to make them be automorphic. We will show that the automorphism orbit of each tuple of this model is 𝔈α+1-definable. This will imply that such a generic model has a Πα+2 Scott sentence and hence has Scott rank at most α+1. This last step uses a result of Chen, Gonzalez, and Harrison-Trainor [1] that having a Πα+2 Scott sentence is equivalent to each automorphism orbit being 𝔈α+1-definable, a strengthening (in the direction in which we apply it) of a result of Montalbán that having a Πα+2 Scott sentence is equivalent to each automorphism orbit being Σα+1-definable.

4.1 Forcing and generic trees

Definition 4.1.

A set 𝔸 of ω1ω formulas is an existential fragment if it satisfies the following properties:

  1. (1)

    𝔸 contains the atomic and negated atomic formulas.

  2. (2)

    𝔸 is stable under taking subformulas, finite conjunctions and disjunctions, and existential quantification.

  3. (3)

    If φ(v0,,vn)𝔸 and τ is a term, then φ(τ,v1,,vn)𝔸.

Lemma 4.2.

Let φ be an 𝔈α sentence of trees. Then there is a countable existential segment 𝔸 of 𝔈α formulas which contains φ. Furthermore, we may find such an 𝔸 together with a countable collection of countable trees with the following properties

  1. (1)

    For any variables x¯ appearing in 𝔸 and ψ𝔸, ψx¯xi𝔸.

  2. (2)

    If ψ(x¯)𝔸 is satisfiable, then there is some T and a¯T such that Tψ(a¯).

  3. (3)

    Suppose T, a¯T, and Tψ(a¯) where ψ(x¯)𝔸. Then there are θi𝔸 for each i as in Lemma 3.5.

Proof.

We build finite approximations 𝔸=n<ω𝔸n and =n<ωn with 𝔸n𝔸n+1 and nn+1 for each n<ω. Set 𝔸0={φ} and 0=. We first ensure that 𝔸 is an existential segment. It is easy to add all the atomic and negated atomic formulas. For each formula which appears in 𝔸n we can ensure each of its subformulas and term substitutions appear at a later stage because there are only countably many of them. Similarly, it is easy to ensure that 𝒜 satisfies the other conditions to be an existential fragment.

We satisfy the remaining three properties in a similar way. For each ψ𝔸k and variable x¯ that appeared in 𝔸k, we can ensure ψx¯xi𝔸n for some n>k. For infinitely many k, we may let 𝔸k+1=𝔸k and

k+1=k{Tψ(x¯):ψ(x¯)𝔸k satisfiable}

where the countable trees Tψ(x¯) are chosen such that there is c¯Tψ(x¯) with Tψ(x¯)ψ(c¯). Finally suppose Tk, ψ(x¯)𝔸k, and a¯T where Tψ(a¯). Then for each i, there is a sentence θi as in Lemma 3.5. We may include all of them in some 𝔸n where n>k. ∎

Given the fixed 𝔈α sentence φ we fix such 𝔸 and for the rest of this article. Let 𝔸 be the satisfiable formulas of 𝔸. For two sentences χ and ψ in 𝔸, we write χψ if every model of χ is a model of ψ. We say χ𝔸 forces unity if for any ψ0,ψ1χ with ψ0,ψ1𝔸, ψ0ψ1 is satisfiable. Also, we say χ𝔸 forces splitting if for every ψ𝔸 with ψχ, there are ψ0,ψ1𝔸 with ψ0,ψ1ψ where ψ0ψ1 is not satisfiable.

We say that a tree T is generic if

  1. (1)

    For any finite subtree a¯T containing the root there is a χ𝔸 that forces unity or splitting such that Tχa¯a0, and

  2. (2)

    For any finite subtree a¯T containing the root and any ψ𝔸 either Tψa¯a0 or there is some χ𝔸 incompatible with ψ such that Tχa¯a0.

We have stated all of these conditions as referring specifically to a0 from among a¯, but because they apply to all tuples from the tree in any order, they are equivalent to the conditions holding for any ai, e.g., (1) is equivalent to

  1. (1*)

    For any finite subtree a¯T containing the root and any i there is a χ𝔸 that forces unity or splitting such that Tχa¯ai.

Writing the conditions in terms of only a0 will simplify the notation, but sometimes we will apply, e.g., (1) in the form of (1*) when we have a fixed tuple a¯ for which we want to apply the condition to every ai at the same.

We say that a tree T has property () if for any finite subtrees a¯,b¯T containing the root and with a0b0 at the same level of the tree, either

  1. (1)

    There are incompatible ψ0,ψ1𝔸 such that Tψ0a¯a0ψ1b¯b0 or

  2. (2)

    There is some ψ𝔸 that forces unity such that Tψa¯a0ψb¯b0.

4.2 Construction of a generic tree

Here we prove that there is a countable model of φ with the aforementioned properties.

Theorem 4.3.

There is a countable generic tree with property () satisfying φ.

Proof.

We execute a Henkin-type construction. Let C be a countably infinite set of constant symbols. We will build finite collections of 𝔈α sentences Φn in the language of trees with additional constants C. The Φn will be an increasing sequence of finite sets, starting with Φ0={φ}, and each consisting of sentences of the form ψ(c¯) where ψ(x¯)𝔸 and c¯C. Φ:=n<ωΦn will satisfy the following conditions.

  1. (1)

    If n<ωψnΦ then ψnΦ for some n<ω.

  2. (2)

    If x¯ψ(x¯)Φ then ψ(c¯)Φ for some c¯C.

  3. (3)

    If n<ωψnΦ then ψnΦ for every n<ω.

  4. (4)

    If x¯ψ(x¯)Φ then ψ(c¯)Φ for every c¯C.

  5. (5)

    For each atomic sentence, either it or its negation is in Φ.

  6. (6)

    The end product is generic:

    1. (a)

      For each c¯C such that Φ implies that c¯ is a finite tree there is a sentence ψ𝔸 that either forces unity or splitting with ψc¯c0Φ.

    2. (b)

      For each c¯C such that Φ implies that c¯ is a finite tree, and each ψ𝔸, either ψc¯c0Φ or there is some χ𝔸 that’s incompatible with ψ and χc¯c0Φ.

  7. (7)

    The end product has property (): for each c¯C such that Φ implies that c¯ is a finite tree, if len(c¯)>1 and c0 and c1 are at the same level, then either there are incompatible ψ0,ψ1𝔸 where ψ0c¯c0Φ and ψ1c¯c1Φ or there is a ψ𝔸 that forces splitting and ψc¯c0ψc¯c1Φ.

    (Though this does not look like (), it is enough to imply it. To achieve () more directly, we would want to meet the following condition: Given a pair of tuples c¯,d¯C such that Φ implies that c¯ and d¯ are finite trees, and c0 and d0 are at the same level, either there are incompatible ψ0,ψ1𝔸 where ψ0c¯c0Φ and ψ1d¯d0Φ or there is a ψ𝔸 that forces splitting and ψc¯c0ψd¯d0Φ. Given such c¯ and d¯, we can assume without loss of generality that no element of c¯ is a descendant of d0, and no element of d¯ is a descendant of c0. Thus for any tree T, Tc¯d¯c0=Tc¯c0 and Tc¯d¯d0=Td¯d0, and similarly for a sentence φ, φc¯d¯c0=φc¯c0 and φc¯d¯d0=φd¯d0. We could then form the joint tuple c¯d¯, and rearrange it so that the first two entries are c0 and d0. Thus we arrive at the condition above.)

In the conditions above, when we say that Φ implies that c¯ is a finite tree, we mean that there is some ci such that ci=r is in Φ, and for each other cj there is ck such that P(cj)=ck is in Φ.

We will ensure that each Φn is satisfiable in a tree by having, at each stage n, a tree T and an assignment v which assigns to each constant in C an element of T making Φn true in T. Moreover, for any constant c appearing in Φn there will be a constant d such that P(c)=d is in Φn and for some k, Pk(c)=r will be in Φn, and we will have cd in Φn for any two constants c,d in C. Thus Φn will put the structure of a finite tree containing the root on the constants that appear in Φn.

Given Φ=Φn we can build a model of Φ whose domain is the constants C, as usual. This model will be a tree because of of the conditions described in the previous paragraph. Since φΦ0Φ we know that φ is true in this tree. Also, conditions (6) and (7) will guarantee that this tree is generic and has property ().

We now describe our construction of the Φn. We begin with Φ0={φ,c=r} for some constant c and T satisfying φ. At each stage n+1, we will define Φn+1 by taking a single step towards satisfying a single instance of one of the above conditions. We use standard dovetailing techniques to make sure that, in the end, all of the conditions are satisfied and will just describe below how to take a single step towards satisfying each of these conditions. For some conditions, namely (3) and (4), we must handle each instance of the condition infinitely many times. As an example, in (3), if nψnΦ then we must return infinitely at infinitely many later stages each time adding a new ψn to Φ. We cannot add them all at once as each Φn must be finite. For each n, we also attach a countable tree T that satisfies Φn, interpreting constants as elements from T. Assuming Φn is satisfiable, such a tree can be chosen from specifically due to (2) of Lemma 4.2.

Step 1:

If, at some stage n+1, we are handling the instance of (1) corresponding to m<ωψmΦn with TΦn: There is some ψm such that Tψm. We add ψm to Φn+1. We still have TΦn+1.

Step 2:

If, at some stage n+1, we are handling the instance of (2) corresponding to xψ(x)Φn with TΦn: There is some aT such that Tψ(a). If a=c in T for some constant symbol cC that appears in Φn, then add ψ(c) to Φn+1. Otherwise add ψ(c) to Φn+1 where cC is some constant symbol that is not mentioned in Φn. In the latter case, we must also choose new constants for any ancestors of aT which are do not already correspond to constants, and also add to Φn the formulas determining the parents of any of these other new constants. We still have TΦn+1.

Step 3:

If, at some stage n+1, we are handling the instance of (3) corresponding to m<ωψmΦn: We add ψm to Φn+1 where ψm is the next conjunct that has not yet been added to Φ. We still have TΦn+1.

Step 4:

If, at some stage n+1, we are handling the instance of (4) corresponding to xψ(x)Φn: We add ψ(c) to Φn+1 where c is the next constant from C (according to some enumeration) for which ψ(c) has not yet been added to Φ. If c does not appear in Φn, we must choose some new element a of T for it to correspond to, and we must also choose new constants from C for any ancestors of aT which are do not already correspond to constants, and also add to Φn the formulas determining the parents of any of these other new constants. We still have TΦn+1.

Step 5:

If at stage n+1 we are handling (5) and have TΦn: Let FC be the finite set of constants that appears in Φn. Then for each atomic sentence involving constants in F, include one of it or its negation to Φn+1 based on whether or not T satisfies it. We still have TΦn+1.

Step 6(a):

If at stage n+1 we are handling the instance of (6a) corresponding to constants c¯ appearing in Φn and have TΦn: Suppose that Φn implies that c¯ is a finite tree. Let η(c¯,b¯):=Φn where b¯ are the constants in Φn that are not c¯. Then Tx¯η(c¯,x¯), so by Lemma 3.5 there are sentences χi𝔸 such that Tc¯ciχi and for any countable tree S if d¯S is a subtree of S isomorphic to c¯ in T, and if Sd¯diχi, then Sx¯η(d¯,x¯). There is a sentence ψχ0 that either forces unity or splitting. Let Φn+1=Φn{ψc¯c0}. It remains to find a tree in that satisfies Φn+1. Since ψ𝔸 there is a countable tree Uψ. We modify T to obtain a tree T^ by setting T^c¯c0=U, and T^c¯ci=Tc¯ci for i>0. (Essentially, we do “surgery” on T by replacing the subtree below c0 with a new subtree.) Then T^ψc¯c0. Since T^c¯ciχi for each i, we have T^c¯cix¯η(c¯,x¯) and so we can choose some assignment of the constants such that T^Φn. Thus Φn+1 is satisfiable, meaning there a tree in that satisfies it by (2) of Lemma 4.2.

Step 6(b):

If at stage n+1 we are handling the instance of (6b) corresponding to constants c¯ appearing in Φn and a formula ψ𝔸, and have TΦn: Suppose that Φn implies that c¯ is a finite tree. Set η(c¯,b¯):=Φn where b¯ are the constants in Φn that are not c¯ and define the χi as we did in the previous step. If χ0 and ψ are incompatible, we let Φn+1=Φn{χ0c¯c0} and don’t change T. Otherwise, we let Φn+1=Φn{ψc¯c0}. In this case χ0ψ is satisfiable, so there is a countable tree Uχ0ψ. We can obtain a tree T^Φn+1 in exactly as in the previous step.

Step 7:

If at stage n+1 we are handling the instance of (7) corresponding to constant c¯ appearing in Φn with len(c¯)>1 and TΦn: Suppose that Φn implies that c¯ is a finite tree. Find χi as before. Suppose there are incompatible ψ0,ψ1𝔸 where χ0ψ0 and χ1ψ1 are each satisfiable. Then we set Φn+1=Φn{ψ0c¯c0,ψ1c¯c1} and find a model of Φn+1 in as before. Thus we may assume that there are no such ψ0,ψ1. In this case χ0χ1 is satisfiable and forces unity. It is satisfiable because otherwise χ0 and χ1 themselves serve as the witnesses ψ0 and ψ1. If χ0χ1 did not force unity, then there would be incompatible ψ0,ψ1χ0χ1 which again we assumed was not the case. So χ0χ1 is satisfiable and forces unity, and we may set Φn+1=Φn{(χ0χ1)c¯c0(χ0χ1)c¯c1} and find a model in as before.∎

4.3 Verification

In this section we prove that a generic tree with property () has Scott rank at most α+1.

Lemma 4.4.

Suppose σ𝔸 forces unity, A,B are generic countable trees, a¯A,b¯B are finite subtrees containing the root, and Aσa¯a0,Bσb¯b0. Further suppose for any finite subtree a¯Aa¯a0 containing a0, and any i, Aa¯a¯ai satisfies a sentence that forces unity. Then the same is true of every finite subtree b¯Bb¯b0 containing b0 and every i, that is, Bb¯b¯bi satisfies a sentence that forces unity.

Proof.

Assume for the sake of contradiction that there is some finite subtree b¯Bb¯b0 containing b0 and some i such that Bb¯b¯bi does not satisfy a sentence that forces unity. By genericity, Bb¯b¯bi satisfies a sentence that forces splitting, say ψ. Thus Bb¯b0x¯[(x¯treeb¯)(ψx¯xi)]. Since A is generic and Aa¯a0 satisfies σ which forces unity, it also satisfies x¯[(x¯treeb¯)(ψx¯xi)]. If a¯Aa¯a0 is its witness, then Aa¯a¯ai both satisfies a sentence that forces splitting and unity, a contradiction. ∎

Definition 4.5.

We say a sentence σ is Scott-like if it forces unity and for every Tσ and finite subtree a¯T that contains the root, Ta¯a0 satisfies a sentence in 𝔸 that forces unity. We say a tree T is Scott if it satisfies a Scott-like sentence.

Lemma 4.6.

Suppose σ𝔸 is Scott-like, A,B are generic trees, and a¯A,b¯B are finite subtrees containing the root. Then if Aa¯a0,Bb¯b0σ then Aa¯a0Bb¯b0.

Proof.

We will define a back-and-forth family F consisting of pairs of tuples from Aa¯a0 and from Bb¯b0. We put (u¯,v¯)F if u¯Aa¯a0 and v¯Bb¯b0 are finite subtrees containing the root, u¯treev¯, and for each i both Aa¯u¯ui and Bb¯v¯vi satisfy the same sentence that forces unity. We prove that F is a back-and-forth family. Clearly (a0,b0)F. Suppose (u¯,v¯)F where σi are sentences forcing unity with Aa¯u¯uiσi and Bb¯v¯viσi, and let uA. Suppose the closest ancestor of u in u¯ is ui and let c¯A be the smallest subtree containing ui and u. Thus for each cj there is a some ψj that forces unity and Aa¯u¯c¯cjψj. Define

η:=x¯[(x¯treec¯)(j<len(c¯)ψjx¯xj)].

Then Aa¯u¯uiη and thus φiη is consistent. If Bb¯c¯viη then by genericity, there is some sentence θ such that Bb¯c¯viθ but θ and η is incompatible. This contradicts that φi forces unity, and thus Bb¯c¯viη. If d¯ is the witness of Bb¯c¯vi to η, then (u¯c¯,v¯d¯)F. The other direction follows similarly, proving that F is a back-and-forth family. ∎

Lemma 4.7.

Each automorphism orbit of a generic tree with property () is definable by a 𝔈α+1 sentence. In particular, such a tree has a Πα+2 Scott sentence and hence has Scott rank at most α+1.

Proof.

Let T be a generic tree with property (). If we can show that each automorphism orbit of T is definable by an 𝔈α+1 sentence, then by Theorem 7.7 of [1], T has a Πα+2 Scott sentence.

Let a¯=(a0,,an1)T be a finite subtree containing the root. For each i<n we define φi the following way. If Ta¯aiψ where ψ is Scott-like, then set φi:=ψ. Otherwise, there’s some b¯Ta¯ai where Ta¯b¯b0ψ for some ψ that forces splitting. By property (), for each finite tree c¯T where c0 is of the same distance from the root as b0, there is some ψc¯ such that Ta¯b¯b0¬ψc¯ but Tc¯c0ψc¯. Using these, set

φi:=y¯[(y¯treeb¯)c¯¬ψc¯y¯y0].

For each i we have Ta¯aiφi.

Now define θ(x¯) by

θ(x¯):=(x¯treea¯)i<nφix¯xi.

Since each φi is either 𝔈α or 𝔄α, θ(x¯) is 𝔈α+1. Clearly Tθ(a¯). We prove that θ(x¯) defines the automorphism orbit of a¯. Suppose Tθ(d¯) for d¯T, and we want to show that (T,a¯)(T,d¯). We have, for each i, Td¯diφi. Since we already have d¯treea¯, it remains to prove Td¯diTa¯ai for each i<n. We induct on the tree structure of a¯, starting with the leaves as the base case. Suppose ai is a leaf of a¯. If φi is Scott-like, Td¯diTa¯ai by Lemma 4.6. If φi is not Scott-like, if ai=di then since they are leaves we have Ta¯ai=Td¯di. We argue that ai=di by contradiction; suppose to the contrary that that aibi. For b¯ the tuple in Ta¯ai used in the definition of φi, we have Td¯diy¯[(y¯treeb¯)c¯¬ψc¯y¯y0]. Since ai and di are of the same distance from the root and aidi, for any possible witness y¯=c¯ in Td¯di we would have b0c0 as they extend ai and bi respectively. Also, b0 and c0 are of the same height. Thus Td¯d0ψc¯c¯c0, contradicting that y¯=c¯ was a witness to Td¯d0φi.

Now for the inductive case, suppose Td¯djTa¯aj for every descendant aj of ai and dj or di. We must argue that Ta¯aiTd¯di. If φi is Scott-like, Td¯diTa¯ai. If not, by similar reasoning as before, ai=di. This part of the argument in the previous paragraph did not use the assumption that ai and di were leaves; it was only to then argue that if ai=di then Td¯diTa¯ai that we used this fact. We will now argue for this same fact but this time we must use the inductive hypothesis. Consider the children of ai=di. Without loss of generality let the children of ai which also appear in a¯ be a0,,ak. Similarly, the children of di which also appear in d¯ are d0,,dk. Using the induction hypothesis, the full subtrees of T below each of a0,,ak are isomorphic to the full subtrees of T below each of d0,,dk respectively. The isomorphism type of Ta¯ai is determined by the isomorphism types of the full subtrees of T below the children of ai which do not appear in a¯, and the isomorphism type of Td¯di is determined by the isomorphism types of the full subtrees of T below the children of di which do not appear in d¯. Since ai=di, the isomorphism types of full subtrees of T below the children of ai are the same as the isomorphism types of full subtrees of T below the children of di, counting multiplicity. Taking away the isomorphism types corresponding to a0,,ak on one side and d0,,dk on the other, we still have the same isomorphism types. Thus, we conclude that Ta¯aiTd¯di. ∎

Remark 4.8.

A key fact for the analogue of Lemma 4.7 for linear orders, in the treatment overlapping intervals, was a theorem of Lindenbaum and Tarski [LT30]: If K and L are linear order, and for each n the product order Kn is an initial segment of L, then Kω is an initial segment of L and so K+LL. No analogous fact is required for trees. Instead, we are able to argue that we do not need to consider overlapping trees. This is responsible for the improved upper bounds we obtain.

5 Lower bounds

Here we give a lower bound: We find a Π2 theory of trees with no models with Σ3 Scott sentence.

Proposition 5.1.

There is a satisfiable Π2 sentence φ extending the axioms of trees such that every model of φ has a Π3 Scott sentence but no Σ3 Scott sentence.

Proof.

Consider a language with the parent relation P, constant symbol r for the root, and unary predicates Ri for each i<ω. One may think of the Ri as colours, and we call a tree with the additional relations Ri a coloured tree. We can transform any coloured tree into a tree, and these two structures are effectively Σ1 bi-interpretable with the bi-interpretation being uniform among all coloured trees. (See [12] or [HMM+17, HMM18] for background on infinitary bi-interpretability.) Thus we can prove the theorem by constructing such an example of coloured trees. The transformation can be defined recursively. Given a coloured tree T with root r, let a0,a1, be the children of r, and let Ti be the coloured subtrees of T below ai.

ra0a1a2T0T1T2.

Let n be the colour of r. Then Φ(T) will be the following tree.

ra0a1a2Φ(T0)Φ(T1)Φ(T2)length n+1.

It is straightforward to see that each of the colours are both universally and existentially definable in Φ(T), and T and Φ(T) are infinitary bi-interpretable. For the remainder of the proof we work with coloured trees.

The sentence φ will say that the P is the parent relation of a tree with root r. The sentence φ will also say that the tree has height 1 (xx=rP(x)=r) and is infinite (xP(x)=r), as well as that any two children of the root differ on some colour (xyn<ω¬(Rn(x)Rn(y))) and that each finite set of colours is realized. This last condition can be expressed as

σ2<ωxi<len(σ)(¬)σ(i)Ri(x)

where (¬)1 is just ¬ and (¬)0 is ignored. Thus φ is Π2 and one can show it is consistent using standard arguments.

By [Mon15] it suffices to show that if Tφ then each automorphism orbit is Σ2 definable but there is some automorphism orbit that is not Σ1 definable, even with parameters. Let a¯T. For i<len(a¯) let σi2ω be such that Tn<ω(¬)σi(n)Rn(ai). Then the formula i<len(a¯)n<ω(¬)σi(n)Rn(xi) defines a¯, and this is a Π1 formula.

For the sake of contradiction suppose every automorphism orbit is Σ1-definable with parameters p¯T. Since T is infinite, we may pick some bT that is not the root and not part of p¯. Suppose y¯ψ(x,y¯,p¯) is a Σ1 formula defining b, where ψ is a first order quantifier free formula. Let Tψ(b,c¯,p¯) where c¯T and let R0,,Rn1 be the only unary predicates that appears in ψ. Because every finite choice of colours appears and every vertex receives different colours, there is a bT that is not b, the root, nor one of p¯, but agrees with b on the first n colours, i.e., Ti<nRi(b)Ri(b). If c¯ is c¯ with changing the appearances of b to b, then (b,c¯,p¯) and (b,c¯,p¯) have the same first order quantifier free diagram if we restrict the colours to R0,,Rn1. Thus Tψ(b,c¯,p¯), meaning bb. However, since b and b disagree on one of the colours Ri (for in), this is a contradiction. ∎

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