Scott spectral gaps for trees are bounded
Abstract
Given a Borel class of trees, we show that there is a tree in that class whose Scott sentence is not too much more complicated than the definition of the class. In particular, if the class is definable by a sentence, then there is a model of Scott rank at most . This gives another proof—and one that does not require first proving Vaught’s conjecture for trees—of the fact that trees are not faithfully Borel complete.
1 Introduction
Given a countable mathematical structure , such as a graph, group, or linear order, Scott [SCO65] showed that there is a sentence of the infinitary logic that characterizes that structure up to isomorphism among countable structures in the sense that for countable structures , we have if and only if . Such a sentence is called a Scott sentence for . We can measure the complexity of describing up to isomorphism by assigning to an ordinal-valued Scott rank. There are a number of almost but not quite equivalent definitions of Scott rank. The one that we will use is due to Montalbán [MON15] and defines the Scott rank of to be the least such that has a Scott sentence. This definition is particularly robust, and measures in addition the complexity of describing the automorphism orbits of the structure.
Given an sentence , we think of as a theory defining a class of models, and we ask what the possible Scott ranks of the models of might be.
Definition 1.1.
Let be an sentence. The Scott spectrum of is the set
In [HAR18] the first author showed that there are theories which have low complexity, but all of whose models have high complexity. For example, for any , there is a sentence all of whose models have Scott rank . Moreover, such an example could be found within any universal class of structures (see [HKS+02] and Chapter VI of [MON21]), such as graphs or fields. On the other hand, in [4], the first author and Gonzalez showed that if a sentence extends the axioms of linear orders then there is a model of of Scott rank at most . This was the first non-trivial case in which such a result is known.
In this paper we consider the case of (simple) trees, which are rooted connected acyclic graphs. We use the language where is a constant standing for the root and is the parent relation, that is, means that is the parent of . (We write the parent relation using functional notation for clarity, but formally we take our language to be a relational language so that we can define the back-and-forth relations in the standard way.) Our motivation for considering trees arises from faithful Borel embeddings, a topic somewhat connected to Vaught’s conjecture. Steel [STE78] proved that Vaught’s conjecture is true for linear orders and trees,111And indeed for a more general definition of trees than the one that we consider here. while of course Vaught’s conjecture is open in general. While linear orders and trees are Borel complete [FS89], this is not enough to imply that Vaught’s conjecture is true in general. The reason is that, as shown by Gao [GAO01], linear orders and trees are not faithfully Borel complete, that is, the saturation of the image of a Borel reduction from graphs to linear orders or trees cannot be Borel. For classes of structures which are faithfully Borel complete, including for example graphs, Vaught’s conjecture for that class would imply the full Vaught’s conjecture. As proved in [4], having bounded Scott spectral gaps implies that a class is not faithfully Borel complete, and in a way which does not require first verifying Vaught’s conjecture for that class (whereas Gao’s argument went through proving a strengthening of Vaught’s conjecture for linear orders and trees). A central open question is whether Boolean algebras are faithfully Borel complete and whether Vaught’s conjecture is true for them, and so studying Scott spectral gaps for Boolean algebras would be a way of studying the former question without having to first resolve the latter. We refer the reader to [4] for a more detailed discussion of these connections.
In this context, it is natural to try to prove that Scott spectral gaps are bounded for trees. This is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1.2.
Given a satisfiable sentence of trees, there is a tree with a Scott sentence and hence Scott rank at most .
The high-level structure of the argument is similar to the case of linear orders, though of course the details differ. In particular, the reader will note that we obtain a better bound for trees than that for linear orders. While this paper is mathematically self-contained, our explanatory discussion of material that is analogous to that appearing in [4], especially that in Section 2, will be brief. We refer the reader to [4] for a more detailed development.
As for linear orders, we also obtain non-trivial lower bounds, but there remains a gap between the lower bounds and the upper bounds.
Theorem 1.3.
There is a theory of trees such that no model of has a Scott sentence, and hence every model has Scott rank at least .
2 Back-and-forth relations and hierarchies of formulas
In this section we outline the general background needed to carry out the argument. Throughout this paper, all structures will be countable and all languages relational. Central to the ideas of the argument are the asymmetric back-and-forth relations.
Definition 2.1.
The asymmetric back-and-forth relations , for , are defined by:
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•
if and satisfy the same quantifier-free formulas from among the first -many formulas.
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•
For , if for each and there is such that .
We define if and .
The interpretation of is that in the back-and-forth game between and , starting with the partial isomorphism and with the first player Spoiler to play next in , the second player Duplicator can play without losing along an ordinal clock . Recall that if Duplicator can continue playing forever, then .
The asymmetric back-and-forth relations can be characterized in relation to the quantifier complexity hierarchy / of -formulas.
Theorem 2.2 (Karp [KAR65]).
For any , structures and , and tuples and , the following are equivalent:
-
(1)
.
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(2)
Every formula true about in is true about in .
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(3)
Every formula true about in is true about in .
However, as shown in [4], there is no formula defining the set of such that . Instead, as there, we will make use of the hierarchies and as introduced in [1].
Definition 2.3.
All connectives below are countable.
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•
-
•
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•
closure of under and
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•
closure of under and
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•
closure of under
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•
closure of under
Each formula can be written in the form
where the formulas are for some , and similarly a formula can be written in the form
where each is for some .
The key difference between these two hierarchies is that a formula of the form is only while being . The two main facts we use are stated in the following lemmas.
Lemma 2.4 (Chen, Gonzalez, and Harrison-Trainor [1]).
For any , structures and , and tuples and , the following are equivalent:
-
(1)
.
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(2)
Every formula true about in is true about in .
-
(3)
Every formula true about in is true about in .
Lemma 2.5 (Chen, Gonzalez, and Harrison-Trainor [1]).
Let be a countable language and be a countable -structure. For each and nonzero there is an formula such that for any countable -structure and ,
3 Back-and-forth relations and trees
A common assumption when working with back-and-forth relations and trees is that whenever a tuple of a tree appears, it is closed under the parent relation and so is a subtree of . We will make this assumption, which we will often abbreviate by saying that “ is a finite subtree of ”. In the context of this paper, this assumption can be justified by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1.
Let and be trees and and . Let consist of and all of its ancestors, and similarly for and in , with both tuples listed in corresponding order. Then for any , if and only if .
Proof.
If then as and are subtuples of and respectively. On the other hand, suppose that . We know that if then for any formula . In particular, if is a finitary quantifier-free formula defining with respect to , then and moreover is the only such tuple. We must argue that if then for any formula . Suppose . Then so . Since is a defining formula for , we see . ∎
For linear orders, the analysis in [4] breaks the linear order up into intervals. The point was that the back-and-forth relations on linear orders can be broken up into the back-and-forth relations on intervals as follows. Given linear orders and , and elements and , we have if and only if each of the corresponding intervals in and are related in the same way, that is , , and so on. We must identify an analogous way of breaking trees up into their constituent parts. We do this as follows.
Definition 3.2.
Let be a finite subtree of . Define , the descendant tree of avoiding , to be the tree consisting of and its descendants that are not in , with as its root.
Note that the trees are all disjoint from each other, and that the isomorphism type of is determined by the finite tree together with the isomorphism types of . can be defined by the following formula :
With the formula we may relativize a formula to a tree . We obtain a formula of the same complexity such that if is a finite subtree of then
We do this by replacing each quantifier in with and each quantifier in with . Since is a formula, and are the same complexity / or /.
Remark 3.3.
Corresponding to the fact that a subinterval of a subinterval of a linear order is a subinterval of that linear order, we have the following fact. Given a subtree of , and where each is a subtree of containing the roots , note that . Note that each entry of is contained in , so that for example has appearing twice, which we will allow to avoid cumbersome notation. We will sometimes write for .
To see that the are the right analogue of intervals in a linear order, we prove the following fact about how back-and-forth relations between tuples in trees break up into back-and-forth relations between their descendant trees.
Lemma 3.4.
Let and be trees and let and be finite subtrees. Let . Then if and only if and for each . Here means and are isomorphic as trees.
Proof.
First suppose . Clearly . Given , suppose that where is . Then , so , meaning . Thus .
Now suppose and for each . Let and . Without loss of generality let where for each . Then there are such that . We may assume that the are subtrees of containing and similarly for and . Then, by the induction hypothesis we have which is the same as by Remark 3.3. Then—again, by the induction hypothesis—we have and thus . ∎
The following lemma is a syntactic version of this previous fact. As with linear orders, the lemma is only true for sentences, and not for sentences. (A counterexample arises from the sentence defined in Proposition 5.1, with the proof being similar to the corresponding lemma from [4].)
Lemma 3.5.
Let be a tree and be a finite subtree containing the root. Suppose where is a formula. Then there are sentences such that and if is a tree and has and then .
Proof.
Without loss of generality let be of the form where each is for some . Since there is some and such that . Without loss of generality suppose where is a subtree of containing . Note that following Remark 3.3 we have . By Lemma 2.5 there are sentences such that if and only if . For each define
where stands for the infinitary quantifier-free formula with free variables which expresses that the parent relations on is the same as on after identifying the roots. Then . Suppose is a tree and is a finite subtree containing the root with and for each . Let be the witness of in . Then , so by Lemma 3.4 . Thus for and therefore . ∎
4 Proof of the main theorem
In this section we prove the main theorem, which is that given a sentence of trees, there is a tree such that has a Scott sentence and hence has Scott rank at most . As in [4], since each sentence is , after replacing by it suffices to assume that is and show that is has a model with a Scott sentence and hence Scott rank at most . This sentence will be fixed for the remainder of this section.
The overall strategy is as follows. We use a Henkin construction to build a model of which is generic in a certain sense. Intuitively, one should think that we try to make any two tuples different from each other, if possible, by a sentence. If this fails, then we will try to make them be automorphic. We will show that the automorphism orbit of each tuple of this model is -definable. This will imply that such a generic model has a Scott sentence and hence has Scott rank at most . This last step uses a result of Chen, Gonzalez, and Harrison-Trainor [1] that having a Scott sentence is equivalent to each automorphism orbit being -definable, a strengthening (in the direction in which we apply it) of a result of Montalbán that having a Scott sentence is equivalent to each automorphism orbit being -definable.
4.1 Forcing and generic trees
Definition 4.1.
A set of formulas is an existential fragment if it satisfies the following properties:
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(1)
contains the atomic and negated atomic formulas.
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(2)
is stable under taking subformulas, finite conjunctions and disjunctions, and existential quantification.
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(3)
If and is a term, then .
Lemma 4.2.
Let be an sentence of trees. Then there is a countable existential segment of formulas which contains . Furthermore, we may find such an together with a countable collection of countable trees with the following properties
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(1)
For any variables appearing in and , .
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(2)
If is satisfiable, then there is some and such that .
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(3)
Suppose , , and where . Then there are for each as in Lemma 3.5.
Proof.
We build finite approximations and with and for each . Set and . We first ensure that is an existential segment. It is easy to add all the atomic and negated atomic formulas. For each formula which appears in we can ensure each of its subformulas and term substitutions appear at a later stage because there are only countably many of them. Similarly, it is easy to ensure that satisfies the other conditions to be an existential fragment.
We satisfy the remaining three properties in a similar way. For each and variable that appeared in , we can ensure for some . For infinitely many , we may let and
where the countable trees are chosen such that there is with Finally suppose , , and where . Then for each , there is a sentence as in Lemma 3.5. We may include all of them in some where . ∎
Given the fixed sentence we fix such and for the rest of this article. Let be the satisfiable formulas of . For two sentences and in , we write if every model of is a model of . We say forces unity if for any with , is satisfiable. Also, we say forces splitting if for every with , there are with where is not satisfiable.
We say that a tree is generic if
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(1)
For any finite subtree containing the root there is a that forces unity or splitting such that , and
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(2)
For any finite subtree containing the root and any either or there is some incompatible with such that .
We have stated all of these conditions as referring specifically to from among , but because they apply to all tuples from the tree in any order, they are equivalent to the conditions holding for any , e.g., (1) is equivalent to
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(1*)
For any finite subtree containing the root and any there is a that forces unity or splitting such that .
Writing the conditions in terms of only will simplify the notation, but sometimes we will apply, e.g., (1) in the form of (1*) when we have a fixed tuple for which we want to apply the condition to every at the same.
We say that a tree has property if for any finite subtrees containing the root and with at the same level of the tree, either
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(1)
There are incompatible such that or
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(2)
There is some that forces unity such that .
4.2 Construction of a generic tree
Here we prove that there is a countable model of with the aforementioned properties.
Theorem 4.3.
There is a countable generic tree with property satisfying .
Proof.
We execute a Henkin-type construction. Let be a countably infinite set of constant symbols. We will build finite collections of sentences in the language of trees with additional constants . The will be an increasing sequence of finite sets, starting with , and each consisting of sentences of the form where and . will satisfy the following conditions.
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(1)
If then for some .
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(2)
If then for some .
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(3)
If then for every .
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(4)
If then for every .
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(5)
For each atomic sentence, either it or its negation is in .
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(6)
The end product is generic:
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(a)
For each such that implies that is a finite tree there is a sentence that either forces unity or splitting with .
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(b)
For each such that implies that is a finite tree, and each , either or there is some that’s incompatible with and .
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(a)
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(7)
The end product has property : for each such that implies that is a finite tree, if and and are at the same level, then either there are incompatible where and or there is a that forces splitting and .
(Though this does not look like , it is enough to imply it. To achieve more directly, we would want to meet the following condition: Given a pair of tuples such that implies that and are finite trees, and and are at the same level, either there are incompatible where and or there is a that forces splitting and . Given such and , we can assume without loss of generality that no element of is a descendant of , and no element of is a descendant of . Thus for any tree , and , and similarly for a sentence , and . We could then form the joint tuple , and rearrange it so that the first two entries are and . Thus we arrive at the condition above.)
In the conditions above, when we say that implies that is a finite tree, we mean that there is some such that is in , and for each other there is such that is in .
We will ensure that each is satisfiable in a tree by having, at each stage , a tree and an assignment which assigns to each constant in an element of making true in . Moreover, for any constant appearing in there will be a constant such that is in and for some , will be in , and we will have in for any two constants in . Thus will put the structure of a finite tree containing the root on the constants that appear in .
Given we can build a model of whose domain is the constants , as usual. This model will be a tree because of of the conditions described in the previous paragraph. Since we know that is true in this tree. Also, conditions (6) and (7) will guarantee that this tree is generic and has property .
We now describe our construction of the . We begin with for some constant and satisfying . At each stage , we will define by taking a single step towards satisfying a single instance of one of the above conditions. We use standard dovetailing techniques to make sure that, in the end, all of the conditions are satisfied and will just describe below how to take a single step towards satisfying each of these conditions. For some conditions, namely (3) and (4), we must handle each instance of the condition infinitely many times. As an example, in (3), if then we must return infinitely at infinitely many later stages each time adding a new to . We cannot add them all at once as each must be finite. For each , we also attach a countable tree that satisfies , interpreting constants as elements from . Assuming is satisfiable, such a tree can be chosen from specifically due to (2) of Lemma 4.2.
- Step 1:
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If, at some stage , we are handling the instance of (1) corresponding to with : There is some such that . We add to . We still have .
- Step 2:
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If, at some stage , we are handling the instance of (2) corresponding to with : There is some such that . If in for some constant symbol that appears in , then add to . Otherwise add to where is some constant symbol that is not mentioned in . In the latter case, we must also choose new constants for any ancestors of which are do not already correspond to constants, and also add to the formulas determining the parents of any of these other new constants. We still have .
- Step 3:
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If, at some stage , we are handling the instance of (3) corresponding to : We add to where is the next conjunct that has not yet been added to . We still have .
- Step 4:
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If, at some stage , we are handling the instance of (4) corresponding to : We add to where is the next constant from (according to some enumeration) for which has not yet been added to . If does not appear in , we must choose some new element of for it to correspond to, and we must also choose new constants from for any ancestors of which are do not already correspond to constants, and also add to the formulas determining the parents of any of these other new constants. We still have .
- Step 5:
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If at stage we are handling (5) and have : Let be the finite set of constants that appears in . Then for each atomic sentence involving constants in , include one of it or its negation to based on whether or not satisfies it. We still have .
- Step 6(a):
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If at stage we are handling the instance of (6a) corresponding to constants appearing in and have : Suppose that implies that is a finite tree. Let where are the constants in that are not . Then , so by Lemma 3.5 there are sentences such that and for any countable tree if is a subtree of isomorphic to in , and if , then . There is a sentence that either forces unity or splitting. Let . It remains to find a tree in that satisfies . Since there is a countable tree . We modify to obtain a tree by setting , and for . (Essentially, we do “surgery” on by replacing the subtree below with a new subtree.) Then . Since for each , we have and so we can choose some assignment of the constants such that . Thus is satisfiable, meaning there a tree in that satisfies it by (2) of Lemma 4.2.
- Step 6(b):
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If at stage we are handling the instance of (6b) corresponding to constants appearing in and a formula , and have : Suppose that implies that is a finite tree. Set where are the constants in that are not and define the as we did in the previous step. If and are incompatible, we let and don’t change . Otherwise, we let . In this case is satisfiable, so there is a countable tree . We can obtain a tree in exactly as in the previous step.
- Step 7:
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If at stage we are handling the instance of (7) corresponding to constant appearing in with and : Suppose that implies that is a finite tree. Find as before. Suppose there are incompatible where and are each satisfiable. Then we set and find a model of in as before. Thus we may assume that there are no such . In this case is satisfiable and forces unity. It is satisfiable because otherwise and themselves serve as the witnesses and . If did not force unity, then there would be incompatible which again we assumed was not the case. So is satisfiable and forces unity, and we may set and find a model in as before.∎
4.3 Verification
In this section we prove that a generic tree with property has Scott rank at most .
Lemma 4.4.
Suppose forces unity, are generic countable trees, are finite subtrees containing the root, and . Further suppose for any finite subtree containing , and any , satisfies a sentence that forces unity. Then the same is true of every finite subtree containing and every , that is, satisfies a sentence that forces unity.
Proof.
Assume for the sake of contradiction that there is some finite subtree containing and some such that does not satisfy a sentence that forces unity. By genericity, satisfies a sentence that forces splitting, say . Thus . Since is generic and satisfies which forces unity, it also satisfies . If is its witness, then both satisfies a sentence that forces splitting and unity, a contradiction. ∎
Definition 4.5.
We say a sentence is Scott-like if it forces unity and for every and finite subtree that contains the root, satisfies a sentence in that forces unity. We say a tree is Scott if it satisfies a Scott-like sentence.
Lemma 4.6.
Suppose is Scott-like, are generic trees, and are finite subtrees containing the root. Then if then .
Proof.
We will define a back-and-forth family consisting of pairs of tuples from and from . We put if and are finite subtrees containing the root, , and for each both and satisfy the same sentence that forces unity. We prove that is a back-and-forth family. Clearly . Suppose where are sentences forcing unity with and , and let . Suppose the closest ancestor of in is and let be the smallest subtree containing and . Thus for each there is a some that forces unity and . Define
Then and thus is consistent. If then by genericity, there is some sentence such that but and is incompatible. This contradicts that forces unity, and thus . If is the witness of to , then . The other direction follows similarly, proving that is a back-and-forth family. ∎
Lemma 4.7.
Each automorphism orbit of a generic tree with property is definable by a sentence. In particular, such a tree has a Scott sentence and hence has Scott rank at most .
Proof.
Let be a generic tree with property (). If we can show that each automorphism orbit of is definable by an sentence, then by Theorem 7.7 of [1], has a Scott sentence.
Let be a finite subtree containing the root. For each we define the following way. If where is Scott-like, then set . Otherwise, there’s some where for some that forces splitting. By property , for each finite tree where is of the same distance from the root as , there is some such that but . Using these, set
For each we have .
Now define by
Since each is either or , is . Clearly . We prove that defines the automorphism orbit of Suppose for , and we want to show that . We have, for each , . Since we already have , it remains to prove for each . We induct on the tree structure of , starting with the leaves as the base case. Suppose is a leaf of . If is Scott-like, by Lemma 4.6. If is not Scott-like, if then since they are leaves we have . We argue that by contradiction; suppose to the contrary that that . For the tuple in used in the definition of , we have . Since and are of the same distance from the root and , for any possible witness in we would have as they extend and respectively. Also, and are of the same height. Thus , contradicting that was a witness to .
Now for the inductive case, suppose for every descendant of and or . We must argue that . If is Scott-like, . If not, by similar reasoning as before, . This part of the argument in the previous paragraph did not use the assumption that and were leaves; it was only to then argue that if then that we used this fact. We will now argue for this same fact but this time we must use the inductive hypothesis. Consider the children of . Without loss of generality let the children of which also appear in be . Similarly, the children of which also appear in are . Using the induction hypothesis, the full subtrees of below each of are isomorphic to the full subtrees of below each of respectively. The isomorphism type of is determined by the isomorphism types of the full subtrees of below the children of which do not appear in , and the isomorphism type of is determined by the isomorphism types of the full subtrees of below the children of which do not appear in . Since , the isomorphism types of full subtrees of below the children of are the same as the isomorphism types of full subtrees of below the children of , counting multiplicity. Taking away the isomorphism types corresponding to on one side and on the other, we still have the same isomorphism types. Thus, we conclude that . ∎
Remark 4.8.
A key fact for the analogue of Lemma 4.7 for linear orders, in the treatment overlapping intervals, was a theorem of Lindenbaum and Tarski [LT30]: If and are linear order, and for each the product order is an initial segment of , then is an initial segment of and so . No analogous fact is required for trees. Instead, we are able to argue that we do not need to consider overlapping trees. This is responsible for the improved upper bounds we obtain.
5 Lower bounds
Here we give a lower bound: We find a theory of trees with no models with Scott sentence.
Proposition 5.1.
There is a satisfiable sentence extending the axioms of trees such that every model of has a Scott sentence but no Scott sentence.
Proof.
Consider a language with the parent relation , constant symbol for the root, and unary predicates for each . One may think of the as colours, and we call a tree with the additional relations a coloured tree. We can transform any coloured tree into a tree, and these two structures are effectively bi-interpretable with the bi-interpretation being uniform among all coloured trees. (See [12] or [HMM+17, HMM18] for background on infinitary bi-interpretability.) Thus we can prove the theorem by constructing such an example of coloured trees. The transformation can be defined recursively. Given a coloured tree with root , let be the children of , and let be the coloured subtrees of below .
Let be the colour of . Then will be the following tree.
It is straightforward to see that each of the colours are both universally and existentially definable in , and and are infinitary bi-interpretable. For the remainder of the proof we work with coloured trees.
The sentence will say that the is the parent relation of a tree with root . The sentence will also say that the tree has height 1 () and is infinite (), as well as that any two children of the root differ on some colour () and that each finite set of colours is realized. This last condition can be expressed as
where is just and is ignored. Thus is and one can show it is consistent using standard arguments.
By [Mon15] it suffices to show that if then each automorphism orbit is definable but there is some automorphism orbit that is not definable, even with parameters. Let . For let be such that . Then the formula defines , and this is a formula.
For the sake of contradiction suppose every automorphism orbit is -definable with parameters . Since is infinite, we may pick some that is not the root and not part of . Suppose is a formula defining , where is a first order quantifier free formula. Let where and let be the only unary predicates that appears in . Because every finite choice of colours appears and every vertex receives different colours, there is a that is not , the root, nor one of , but agrees with on the first colours, i.e., . If is with changing the appearances of to , then and have the same first order quantifier free diagram if we restrict the colours to . Thus , meaning . However, since and disagree on one of the colours (for ), this is a contradiction. ∎
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